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INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that the design of federal tax law strongly
influences state tax policy choices.1 What has not been appreciated is how
the current structure of federal tax law incentivizes state governments to
1

See, e.g., Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates,
and the “Salt” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 805 (2008) (“Finally, I note that § 164, and therefore
the Alternative Minimum Tax, can have serious effects on federal–state relations . . . .”); Louis Kaplow,
Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,
82 VA. L. REV. 413, 413 (1996) (“Whether state and local taxes are deductible is believed to have
important effects on revenue, tax equity, and the operation of state and local governments.”); Ruth
Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1274 (2013)
(“[T]he federal government wields substantial passive influence over state taxation by defining the tax
base.”); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2593 (2005)
(“[I]nterdependencies between the federal and state tax structures . . . are a crucial but poorly
understood feature of fiscal federalism.”).
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adopt tax policies that inflict costs on the federal government, at the
expense of national welfare.2 In other words, the federal government
currently incentivizes state governments to adopt tax structures that literally
devour the federal government’s tax revenues. To date, there has been little
appetite for reform. 3
This Article’s explication of the tax cannibalization problem builds on
recent economics literature on vertical externalities. The economics
literature has used the term “vertical externalities” to indicate when some
of the costs or benefits of a state-level tax policy decision affect the federal
government rather than the state making the tax policy decision (or vice
versa).4 Over the past two decades, economists have developed several
theoretical accounts of vertical externalities.5 Yet this economics literature
has primarily focused on the questions of whether different tiers of
government tax too much or too little and promote too much or too little
distribution.6 The economics literature has not as of yet analyzed the

2

A full discussion of the “nuttiness” of current state-level tax policy would require a massive
addition to the length of this article and would distract from our primary argument and analysis. Suffice
it to say that tax experts generally agree that most states currently tax corporate income and capital
gains in ways that are excessively and unnecessarily harmful to the national economy. Even those who
support state governments taxing capital income and corporate income—as a theoretical matter—
generally agree that the ways in which state governments currently tax these bases are perverse. For
further explanation and discussion on these points, see, for example, DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX
POLICY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2011); Charles E. McLure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and
Local Taxes—And the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 841, 848–53 (2002).
3
To begin to understand this riddle, consider, for instance, that the federal government has taxed
capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income for most of the history of the federal income tax. A
primary reason for this is because, in the absence of dramatic accompanying reforms, it is thought that
taxing federal capital gains at the current top ordinary income rates would substantially exceed the
revenue-maximizing federal capital gains tax rate (such that lowering the tax rate would then increase
revenues) due to selective realization responses. Yet most state governments tax capital gains and
ordinary income at the same rates, and—in stark contrast to the situation at the federal level—there is
only minimal discussion of the problem of selective realization responses in state-level tax policy
debates. For further discussion of this problem, see infra Section II.D. For an example of the lack of
attention to this problem in state-level tax policy debates, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
21ST CENTURY ECONOMY (2009), http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/Commission
_on_the_21st_Century_Economy-Final_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GW7D-5WXJ]
(discussing
revenue volatility and other state-focused problems associated with taxing capital gains and corporate
income in California, but not discussing in any significant way how selective realization undermines
efficient revenue generation).
4
Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, Reassessment of the Tiebout Model, 96 J. PUB. ECON.
1063, 1074 (2012).
5
For reviews of this literature, see id. at 1074–75; Yaniv Reingewertz & Ohad Raveh, Corporate
Tax Shocks as Drivers of Vertical Tax Externalities: Evidence from Narrative Federal Tax Shocks 2–6
(Oct. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
6
In addition to this primary focus, certain articles in this economics literature have more
specifically examined cigarette, alcohol, and gasoline excise taxes in the United States and a number of
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implications of vertical externalities for the important, more designoriented questions of what state governments choose to tax or how state
governments structure and implement their tax systems.
Likewise, the prior tax legal literature contains only limited discussion
of how vertical externalities might result in tax cannibalization; the
literature has instead focused on questions related to whether different tiers
of government tax too much or too little and promote too much or too little
distribution.7 Thus, neither the prior tax legal nor the economics literature
has analyzed the implications of vertical externalities for critical questions
related to how the design of federal tax law biases state governments’ tax
policy decisions.8 This Article begins to fill that gap.
In theory, the tax cannibalization problem may occur whenever state
governments and the federal government levy taxes on overlapping tax
bases. We demonstrate that the tax cannibalization problem currently does
occur with respect to state-level taxes on corporate income and capital
gains, and possibly also ordinary income.9 Specifically, we show that state
governments’ current top tax rates on these bases impose large, wasteful
costs through tax cannibalization.
topics related to the structure of fiscal federalism in Canada and Switzerland. See Reingewertz &
Raveh, supra note 5, at 2–6, for a review of the literature.
7
See, e.g., John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of
Redistributive Taxation, 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 113 (2014) (briefly mentioning vertical externalities as part
of a background review of the recent economics literature on the question of whether state and local
governments should attempt to promote distribution); Mason, supra note 1, at 1339 n.300 (mentioning
vertical externalities in one sentence in a footnote). By contrast, the tax legal literature has far more
extensively engaged with the related—but distinct and much larger—economics literature on the
question of whether taxation by one tier of government might either “crowd in” or “crowd out” taxation
by another tier of government. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Brian Galle, Does Federal
Spending “Coerce” States? Evidence from State Budgets, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 989 (2014). For
explanation of why this topic is distinct from our inquiry, see infra note 42.
8
Notably, recent law review articles on fiscal federalism topics by leading tax legal scholars make
almost no mention of vertical externalities (the source of the tax cannibalization problem), despite
vertical externalities having profound implications for the questions addressed by these articles. E.g.,
Mason, supra note 1, at 1339 n.300 (mentioning vertical externalities only as a one-sentence aside);
Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407 (2010) (not mentioning
vertical externalities).
In particular, no prior scholarship evaluates the upward vertical externalities that currently result
from state-level tax rates on corporate income, capital gains, or ordinary income—the focus of this
Article. By contrast, one (as of yet unpublished) economics article does evaluate the downward vertical
externalities produced by the federal government’s corporate income tax rates. Reingewertz & Raveh,
supra note 5. Yet the upward vertical externalities produced by state-level corporate income tax rates
(that we focus on) are dramatically larger than the downward vertical externalities (which are the focus
of that economics article)—as we explain infra note 117.
9
We mostly treat the capital gains and ordinary income components of the personal income tax as
separate tax bases, referring to these simply as “capital gains” and “ordinary income.” However, we
sometimes refer to these two tax bases collectively as the “personal income tax.” By contrast, we treat
the corporate income tax as being a single tax base, referred to as “corporate income.”
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Extrapolating from the existing empirical literature, we develop a
model showing that a typical state’s top corporate income and capital gains
tax rates generate surprisingly large economic waste.10 We propose federallevel reforms that could eliminate much of this economic waste while still
maintaining the current levels for state governments’ revenues and
distribution. Through enacting these reforms, the federal government could
produce a “win, win, win” for the federal government, state governments,
and taxpayers.
Let us now briefly elaborate the nature of the tax cannibalization
problem with an example of state-level corporate income taxes. State-level
corporate income taxes are currently vulnerable to a variety of distortionary
responses that shrink the states’ corporate income tax bases. These
distortionary responses include various forms of tax avoidance and tax
gaming. It is useful to divide these distortionary responses into two
conceptual categories.
The first conceptual category consists of distortionary responses that
involve taxable activity relocating to other states. We label this category as
“horizontal distortions.” Because horizontal distortions involve taxable
activity relocating across state lines, but remaining within the United
States, horizontal distortions do not necessarily shrink the federal
government’s corporate income tax base. Important examples of horizontal
distortionary responses to state-level corporate income tax rates include
corporate taxpayers shifting their physical presence and sales activities
from states that levy higher corporate income tax rates to states that levy
lower corporate income tax rates.11
The second conceptual category consists of the remaining
distortionary responses that do not involve taxable activity relocating to
other states. We label this category as “vertical distortions.” In contrast to
horizontal distortions, vertical distortions do typically shrink the federal
government’s corporate income tax base. Important examples of vertical
distortionary responses to state-level corporate income tax rates include
corporate taxpayers shifting real investment activities abroad, corporate
taxpayers shifting reported profits to subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions,
corporate taxpayers shifting from equity financing to debt financing, and

10

By “large economic waste,” we mean, for instance, that raising a marginal $1.00 of revenue from
a typical state’s top corporate income tax rate generates between $0.50 and $0.95 of “deadweight loss”
(that is, destroyed economic well-being), relative to raising that marginal $1.00 from an alternative form
of taxation. For further discussion, see supra Section III.C.
11
For discussion of these horizontal distortionary responses and estimates of their magnitude, see
Xavier Giroud & Joshua Rauh, State Taxation and the Reallocation of Business Activity: Evidence from
Establishment-Level Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21534, 2015).
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business taxpayers shifting from the use of corporate forms to partnership
forms.12
Vertical distortionary responses are the primary source of the tax
cannibalization problem. Because vertical distortionary responses shrink
both the state government’s corporate income tax base and the federal
government’s corporate income tax base, vertical distortionary responses to
state-level corporate income tax rates deprive the federal government of tax
revenue.
Moreover, the federal government levies much higher tax rates on the
bases of corporate income, ordinary income, and capital gains, than do any
state governments. Consequently, the federal government suffers much
greater harm from vertical distortionary responses to state-level tax rates on
these bases than do the state governments setting these tax rates.
When vertical distortionary responses to a state government’s tax rate
deprive both the federal government and other states’ governments of
revenue, in the aggregate, we refer to this as “tax cannibalization.”
Throughout the remainder of this Article, we explain how tax
cannibalization currently biases state governments’ tax policy decisions
and thereby results in large-scale economic waste.
Indeed, we approximate that—because of tax cannibalization—the top
corporate income and capital gains tax rates in some states currently exceed
their national revenue-maximizing levels. In other words, reducing these
tax rates could actually increase the overall tax revenues raised (in the
aggregate) by the acting state government, the federal government, and
other state governments.
There are at least three reasons why the tax cannibalization problem is
especially severe in the context of fiscal federalism in the United States.13
First, state governments mostly piggyback on the federal government’s taxbase-definition rules for corporate and personal income taxes. Second, the
federal government currently levies tax rates on these bases that are
amongst the highest in the world. Third, under the federal government’s
current tax-base-definition rules, the corporate income and capital gains tax
bases are rather vulnerable to tax avoidance and tax gaming responses. The
combination of these three factors results in state-level tax rates on
corporate income and capital gains generating very large tax
cannibalization.

12

For discussion of these vertical distortionary responses and estimates of their magnitude, see
Ruud A. de Mooij & Sjef Ederveen, Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader’s Guide to Empirical
Findings, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 680 (2008).
13
We elaborate and support these claims below; our purpose here is signposting.
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Because this tax cannibalization primarily harms the federal
government, rather than state governments, state policymakers have little
incentive to reform their tax systems to alleviate this tax cannibalization.
There is great potential for state-level tax reforms that could patch some of
the holes in the federal and state corporate and personal income tax bases.
We yearn for state governments to operate as laboratories of democracy by
devising improved approaches to taxation. But none of this is likely to
happen unless the federal government acts to better coordinate the tax
policy incentives of state and federal governments. Under the current
structure of federal tax law, state governments lack motivation to
implement reforms that would alleviate the tax cannibalization problem.
Two decades ago, Professor Daniel Shaviro concluded that “the
interaction between taxation and federalism is more important than ever,”14
and we argue that this conclusion holds even more so today. As economic
transactions become increasingly global, the harm from misaligned tax
policy grows ever greater. We argue that tax cannibalization is a major
cause of dysfunctional fiscal federalism in the United States, and that the
federal government can and should act to alleviate this problem.
Because of tax cannibalization, the federal government has a large and
direct stake in state government tax policy decisions—in a manner that has
not heretofore been recognized.15 Instructing policymakers about the nature
and current magnitude of tax cannibalization thus offers the potential for
greatly improving the structure of fiscal federalism in the United States.
This Article proceeds in four Parts, plus a Technical Appendix. Part I
elaborates on the economics literature on vertical externalities. Part II
demonstrates that tax cannibalization is currently substantial—perhaps so
large that some state-level tax rates exceed their national revenuemaximizing levels. Part III demonstrates how tax cannibalization biases
state governments’ tax base choices. Part IV explains how the federal
government could alleviate the tax cannibalization problem.

14

Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
895, 895 (1992).
15
For instance, the problem is not mentioned in recent testimony by the leading state and local tax
scholar before Congress. See Tax Reform: What It Means for State and Local Tax and Fiscal Policy:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 46–78 (2012) (statement of Walter Hellerstein,
Francis Shackelford Professor of Taxation, University of Georgia Law School).
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I.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL EXTERNALITIES IN THE
THEORY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM

There is an extensive and longstanding literature on fiscal federalism,
both in legal and economics scholarship.16 This literature has examined
numerous aspects of state-level tax policy and interactions between federaland state-level tax policy. Nevertheless, until relatively recently, this
literature has mostly overlooked the importance of vertical externalities.17
As economists Michael Keen and Christos Kotsogiannis explain in their
seminal article on the topic: “[s]trikingly, the vertical externalities that are
thus at the heart of federal tax architecture have—until recently—been
largely neglected in the theory of fiscal federalism, which has focused
instead on horizontal externalities arising from mobility of the tax base
between the states.”18
To the extent that a state government levies taxes that are higher than
those levied by other states, taxpayers may relocate economic activity
across state lines to reduce their tax burdens. These horizontal distortions
have long been understood to be a major cost of state-level taxation, in
terms of lost economic welfare.19 When any individual state raises its tax
rates, this may drive some economic activity to relocate to other states,
thereby reducing the revenue generated by the tax hike as well as harming
the economy of the state raising its tax rates.
Due to these horizontal distortions, the “classic theoretical result” of
the fiscal federalism literature is that both distribution policy and the
taxation of mobile capital are best left to the federal rather than the state
governments.20 The rationale for this result is that state governments
carrying out these activities generate all of the same problems as when the
federal government does so, in addition to inducing horizontal distortions
related to economic activity being relocated to other states. Classic

16

Stark, supra note 8, at 409.
Reingewertz & Raveh, supra note 5, at 2 (“[V]ertical tax externality . . . is a relatively new topic
in the fiscal federalism literature.”).
18
Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?,
92 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 363 (2002).
19
Recent estimates suggest that horizontal distortions reduced overall national real income and
welfare by about $110 billion in 2012—which represents “considerable spatial misallocation from tax
dispersion relative to the initial levels of tax revenue in GDP.” Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., State Taxes
and Spatial Misallocation 3, 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21760, 2015).
20
Brooks, supra note 7, at 111; see also Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity:
Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389,
1394 (2004) (“[I]n a federal system of governments, redistributive policies should be undertaken
exclusively by the most central level of government.”).
17
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prescriptions of the fiscal federalism literature thus include that state
governments should tax only less mobile factors,21 such as real property.
Of course, numerous commentators have noted that state
governments, in reality, depart quite dramatically from these classic
prescriptions.22 Indeed, the economics literature on vertical externalities
was partially developed to explain and justify why state governments (both
in the United States and in other fiscal federations across the world) depart
from the classic prescriptions of the fiscal federalism literature.23
Nevertheless, to date, most of the literature on vertical externalities has
been highly theoretical, analyzing fiscal federations at an abstract and
general level rather than focusing on the institutional structures of specific
fiscal federations.24
The remainder of this Part elaborates on the prior literature on vertical
externalities so that this Article can then build on that literature to evaluate
the implications for state and federal government fiscal interrelations. For
explanatory purposes, we start by analyzing vertical externalities within a
simple theoretical setup, and then we gradually incorporate additional
complications and institutional detail.
A.

A Simple Analytic Starting Point

We begin with a relatively simple hypothetical that is drawn from the
basic model used to demonstrate vertical externalities in the economics
literature.25 Imagine that a fiscal federation consists of only a single state,
but with both a federal-level government and a state-level government
separately empowered to set their own tax rates. Further imagine that both
the federal-level government and the state-level government care only
about their own tax revenues and do not care about the tax revenues raised
21

Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, 23 ST. TAX
NOTES 775, 783 (2002) (“As public finance economists have long emphasized, in deciding which taxes
should be assigned to different levels of government, special care should be taken to avoid assigning
mobile tax bases to lower levels of government.” (footnote omitted)).
22
See, e.g., McLure, supra note 2, at 567.
23
See Roger H. Gordon & Julie Berry Cullen, Income Redistribution in a Federal System of
Governments, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1100, 1100 (2012) (“The resulting conventional wisdom is that the
Federal government should take primary if not sole responsibility for redistribution. . . . Given this, why
do we see states in the U.S. engaged so actively in redistribution?”).
24
See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text. Moreover, the few prior papers that have analyzed
vertical externalities in relation to the institutional structures of specific fiscal federations have mostly
focused on Canada. E.g., Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, An Empirical Analysis of
Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of Business Income Taxes in Canada, 34 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 481 (2001); Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, A Spatial Analysis of Provincial
Corporate Income Tax Responses: Evidence from Canada, 40 CANADIAN J. ECON. 782 (2007).
25
E.g., Gordon & Cullen, supra note 23, at 1101–03; Michael Keen, Vertical Tax Externalities in
the Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 454, 465–70 (1998).
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by the other government. Finally imagine that there is only a single tax
base accessible to these governments, and that this tax base is fixed. Thus,
tax policy both for the federal and for the state government consists entirely
of each government separately setting a tax rate to be applied to the shared
tax base.
The overall tax rate on this base is then the combined federal and state
tax rates. Because there is only one state, there are no horizontal
distortions. All distortionary responses, such as tax avoidance and tax
gaming, therefore reduce both federal- and state-level revenues.
When either the federal or the state government increases its tax rate,
taxpayers’ distortionary responses shrink the shared tax base. This tax base
shrinkage then reduces the revenues raised by the other government, unless
the other government compensates by increasing its own tax rate.
Consequently, absent some agreement between the federal and state
governments as to tax rates, the overall tax rate will be too high.26
Put another way, there are both upward vertical externalities (because
the federal government loses revenue whenever the state government raises
its tax rate) and downward vertical externalities (because the state
government loses revenue whenever the federal government raises its tax
rate). There is thus a “common pool problem” with respect to the shared
tax base. Unless the two governments reach an agreement to limit the
overall level of taxation, each government will face incentives to overtax
the shared base.
This excessively high taxation can be very costly from a social
welfare perspective. The higher the overall tax rate, the more taxpayers can
be expected to engage in distortionary responses that reduce their overall
tax liabilities.27 These distortionary responses generate what is
synonymously called deadweight loss, “excess burden,” “economic waste,”
or “distortionary costs.”28
The magnitude of these distortionary costs is thought to grow
approximately with the square of the overall tax rate.29 The reason is that
26

Keen, supra note 25, at 466. By “too high,” we mean that the overall tax rate will exceed the
optimal level for maximizing either government’s policy goals.
27
See David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for
Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 56–63 (2014).
28
An illustrative example of such deadweight loss would be a corporation spending millions of
dollars on lawyers and accountants so that its profits can be shifted to a lower tax jurisdiction. Such a
maneuver is expensive but does not actually improve the economic performance of the corporation. It is
as if the corporation has catapulted $1 million dollars into the ocean in order to magically save $10
million dollars in taxes.
29
David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and
Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 375–80 (2015).
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raising the overall tax rate should generally induce both a greater number
of distortionary responses and also more costly distortionary responses at
the margin. Consequently, even a relatively small tax hike can generate
large distortionary costs if the overall tax rate was already high prior to that
tax hike.
To summarize, just as multiple fishermen might overfish a shared
lake or ocean, multiple tiers of government can overtax a shared tax base.
Then, because distortionary costs typically grow exponentially with the
overall tax rate, this overtaxation can be very costly to national welfare.
B.

A More Complex Model Incorporating Multiple States

There are, of course, fifty states plus the District of Columbia, each of
which is empowered to set its own tax policies. How does introducing
multiple states affect the analysis set forth in the previous Section?
The foundational articles in the economics literature on vertical
externalities begin with a model wherein there are multiple states, but
wherein each of these states is identical and the tax base is immobile across
state lines.30 The key implication of adding multiple states in this model is
that the state governments may have different motivations from the federal
government. Assume that every government cares only about the welfare of
citizens who live within its own jurisdiction. The federal government may
care about the impact of its tax rates on state revenues, such that there may
not be any downward vertical externalities. But state governments will not
care much about their tax rates’ impact on federal government revenues,
because the spending funded by federal revenues is spread across all of the
states. This results in upward vertical externalities, with state governments
incentivized to overtax. Again, this overtaxation can be very costly from
the national welfare perspective.
More could be said about this basic model.31 However, it is more
useful for this Article’s purposes to proceed to discuss the next stage of the
analysis in the foundational economics literature. Let us now relax the
assumptions that states are identical and that the tax base is immobile
across state lines. This generates the potential for horizontal distortions. To
the extent that some states set their tax rates higher than other states,
taxpayers may relocate economic activity from the higher tax states to the
lower tax states.

30

E.g., Gordon & Cullen, supra note 23, at 1101–03; Keen, supra, note 25, at 461–70.
See e.g., Alejandro Esteller-Moré et al., Vertical Tax Competition and Consumption Externalities
in a Federation with Lobbying, 96 J. PUB. ECON 295 (2012) (discussing how lobbying and Leviathan
policymakers can influence tax rates).
31
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As noted previously, horizontal distortions can result in real national
welfare costs, potentially making state-level taxation far more costly than
federal-level taxation.32 Additionally, horizontal distortions can result in
“horizontal externalities.”33 When economic activity relocates from a
higher tax state to a lower tax state, this shrinks the tax base of the higher
tax state and reduces that state’s revenue. Yet, this also grows the tax base
of the lower tax state, potentially increasing the revenue raised by that
lower tax state.
The costs from state-level tax hikes inducing horizontal distortions
may thus seem larger from the perspective of state governments
considering tax hikes than from a national welfare perspective. Any
individual state government may consider only the loss to its own revenues
from tax hikes inducing horizontal distortions, ignoring the gain to other
states’ revenues. Horizontal externalities thus potentially exert a downward
pressure on the overall level of state taxation.
The economics literature on vertical externalities focuses on the
questions of whether the overall level of taxation by different tiers of
government is too high or too low and whether different tiers of
government promote too much or too little distribution. This literature
generally concludes that horizontal externalities and vertical externalities
push state governments in conflicting directions.34 When vertical
externalities exceed horizontal externalities, the economics literature
predicts that state governments will set their overall level of taxation too
high from a national welfare perspective. Conversely, when horizontal
externalities exceed vertical externalities, the economics literature predicts
that state governments will set their overall level of taxation too low from a
national welfare perspective.
When evaluating whether state governments set their overall levels of
taxation too high or too low, the economics literature generally concludes
that whether vertical externalities or horizontal externalities dominate is an
empirical question.35 The answer to this question varies across different
institutional environments. In particular, the magnitude of vertical
externalities is partially a function of how high the federal government sets
its tax rates and of how the federal government constructs its tax bases.
Accordingly, when considering whether state governments set their overall
tax levels too high or too low, there is no universal answer to the question
of whether horizontal externalities or vertical externalities dominate.
32
33
34
35
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Among other factors, the answer depends on how the federal government
sets its tax policies.
Our focus in this Article is on state governments’ incentives when
selecting and designing tax bases, not on whether the overall level of state
taxation or distribution is too high or too low. Thus, to cabin controversial
questions about the proper size of governments, throughout most of this
Article we will assume that state governments operate subject to both strict
budget constraints and strict distribution constraints. In other words, we
assume that state governments will raise the same level of overall revenues
and promote the same amount of overall distribution, regardless of the
structure of federal tax law.
By making these simplifying assumptions, we postpone for now
engaging with some questions related to how tax cannibalization might
affect the size of state governments. We later return to analyzing the
implications of relaxing these simplifying assumptions.36
C.

Incorporating Multiple Tax Bases

Most of the economics literature on vertical externalities has
examined only a single, fixed tax base.37 In contrast, this Article evaluates
the implications of vertical externalities for state governments’ incentives
when selecting amongst multiple, variable tax bases.
A handful of papers in the prior economics literature have examined
the implications of vertical externalities when there are multiple (but fixed)
tax bases. Most notably, an article by Michael Keen suggests that the risk
of vertical externalities justifies efforts by a federal government to restrict
state governments from taxing the same bases that are used by the federal
government.38 Because vertical externalities arise from state governments
being empowered to overlap with the tax bases used by the federal
government, the negative impact of vertical externalities could potentially
be mitigated by restricting state governments from levying taxes that
overlap with federal tax bases. However, neither Keen’s article nor
subsequent scholarship in the economics literature discusses the

36

See infra Section IV.F.
See William H. Hoyt, Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in
a System of Hierarchical Governments, 50 J. URB. ECON. 481, 492–93 (2001) (“With the exception of
[one prior article], vertical fiscal externalities have been examined in the context of a single tax base,
generally labor income, shared or ‘cooccupied’ by two different levels of government. . . . [This article
goes further by considering] multiple (two) tax bases.”).
38
See Keen, supra note 25, at 477.
37
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implications of this general point with respect to specific forms of statelevel taxation.39
In addition to Michael Keen’s work, a couple articles in the prior
economics literature have noted that a federal government could correct for
the impact of vertical externalities on state-level tax policy choices through
some combination of: (a) subsidizing state-level use of tax bases that
overlap less with the tax bases used by the federal government, and (b)
penalizing state-level use of tax bases that overlap more with the tax bases
used by the federal government.40 Considering both vertical and horizontal
externalities, then, this analysis suggests that the federal government
perhaps should subsidize state governments’ use of tax bases for which
horizontal externalities overpower vertical externalities and penalize or
restrict state governments’ use of tax bases for which vertical externalities
overpower horizontal externalities.
At least in theory, then, through the proper mix of subsidies, penalties,
and restrictions, a federal government might correct for both the impact of
vertical and horizontal externalities on state governments’ tax policy
choices. Nevertheless, it seems rather unlikely that a federal government
would stumble upon this proper mix by accident. Accordingly, developing
a better understanding of how vertical and horizontal externalities operate
within the context of United States fiscal federalism is crucial for
motivating the federal government to design its tax policies so as to
alleviate the perverse incentives that tax cannibalization otherwise creates
for state government tax decisionmaking.
In sum, whether vertical or horizontal externalities dominate with
respect to any particular state-level tax policy choice depends on how the
federal government sets its tax policies. This question cannot be answered
in the abstract because the answer depends on the institutional structure of
the fiscal federation being considered. Correspondingly, we focus this
Article on how tax cannibalization manifests within the current structure of
United States federal tax law.
39

This is in part because Keen’s analysis relies on traditional assumptions whereby formally
different tax bases have been viewed as being effectively equivalent. See id. at 459–60 (“[T]here is an
important distinction to be made between formal and effective concurrency. . . . For example, suppose
that the states (and only the states) can levy a general sales tax, while the federal government (and only
the federal government) can impose a proportional tax on wage income. Suppose too that these are the
only taxes in the economy. Formal concurrency is then clearly zero. Yet it is well known that (at least
with perfect capital markets) the two taxes are exactly equivalent: effective concurrency is complete.”).
For a critique of these assumptions, see Gamage, supra note 29, at 403–04. For further discussion of
how relaxing these assumptions reveals insights about vertical externalities, see infra Section III.B.
40
Bev Dahlby, Jack Mintz & Sam Wilson, The Deductibility of Provincial Business Taxes in a
Federation with Vertical Fiscal Externalities, 33 CANADIAN J. ECON. 677, 678–79 (2000); Hoyt, supra
note 37, at 510–11.
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II. STATE GOVERNMENTS’ CURRENT TAX RATES GENERATE
SUBSTANTIAL TAX CANNIBALIZATION
We now proceed to the core of our argument—analyzing ways in
which the tax cannibalization problem manifests within the context of
contemporary federal tax law. We demonstrate two major results in this
Part. First, and primarily, we explain that vertical externalities almost
certainly overpower horizontal externalities for the upper end of state tax
rates on corporate income, capital gains, and ordinary income—such that
tax cannibalization is currently positive for these tax rates, and strongly so.
Second, we explain that this positive tax cannibalization is potentially so
large to have biased at least some state governments to set certain of these
tax rates above their national revenue-maximizing levels—such that other
governments may lose more than a dollar of net revenue from tax
cannibalization per marginal dollar of revenue that these states raise from
these tax rates.
More precisely, in regard to our second point, we show that: if the
vertical distortions for the corporate income tax base are at or above the
midpoints of the range reported in the existing empirical literature, then the
current top corporate income tax rates in at least some states likely exceed
their national revenue-maximizing levels. Likewise, we show that: if the
vertical distortions for the capital gains tax base are at or above the
midpoints of the range reported in the existing empirical literature, then the
current top capital gains tax rates in at least some states likely exceed their
national revenue-maximizing levels. By contrast, we show that: only if
either the vertical distortions or the horizontal distortions for the ordinary
income tax base are toward the high-points of the ranges reported in the
existing empirical literature, would current top ordinary income tax rates
then likely exceed their national revenue-maximizing levels in any state.
Moreover, even if one assumed vertical distortions are substantially
below the midpoints reported by the existing empirical literature, we show
that tax cannibalization is still likely positive and substantial—such that it
strongly biases state-level tax policy decisions. Building on the analysis in
this Part, the next Part demonstrates biases that are more certain and that
should hold more generally across the states—implying more profound and
important policy implications.
Some preliminary clarifications are needed before we begin our
analysis. First, both for the biases we demonstrate in this Part, and for the
biases we demonstrate in the next Part, we assess bias as compared to a
baseline of the national interest. Accordingly, we use the term “bias” as
shorthand for expressing when the current structure of federal tax law
results in state governments facing incentives that are perverse from the
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standpoint of national welfare. We will later elaborate on why we adopt a
national welfare perspective and so orient our discussion toward the federal
government’s interests (rather than, say, state governments’ interests).41 For
now, we emphasize that our inquiry is distinct from the related question of
whether federal taxes might either “crowd out” or “crowd in” state taxes.42
Second, we define the “national revenue-maximizing level” for a state
tax rate as the point at which further hiking the tax rate would reduce the
overall tax revenues raised by, in the aggregate, the state government
setting the tax rate, the federal government, and other state governments.43
The national revenue-maximizing level for a state tax rate thus incorporates
both vertical and horizontal externalities. In contrast, the “acting state
revenue-maximizing level” for a state tax rate only factors in the revenue
effect to the state government setting the tax rate, and so does not
incorporate either vertical or horizontal externalities. When vertical
externalities overpower horizontal externalities, the national revenuemaximizing level for a state tax rate will be lower than the acting state
revenue-maximizing level for that tax rate, and vice versa.
The concept that tax rates have revenue-maximizing levels has been
very influential in tax policy debates.44 This concept is often expressed in
terms of the Laffer Curve, wherein “revenue first rises with the tax rate and
then falls,” with the revenue-maximizing level for a tax rate corresponding
with the peak of its Laffer Curve.45

41

See infra Section IV.F.
For example, were the federal government to replace its existing corporate and personal income
taxes with a national sales tax, this would dramatically reduce the vertical externalities associated with
state-level corporate and personal income taxes and would dramatically increase the vertical
externalities associated with state-level sales taxes. This change to federal tax policy would thus quite
clearly alter how state tax policy choices affect national welfare and the federal government’s interests.
However, in contrast, it is not at all clear how this federal policy change (considered on its own) would
affect the actual policy decisions made by state governments. It is possible that this federal policy
change might lead state governments to switch away from levying sales taxes (“crowding out”), but it is
also possible that this federal policy change might lead state governments to switch to greater use of
sales taxes (“crowding in”). For a discussion of the literature on this distinct, but related, question, see
Galle, supra note 7.
43
To contain the scope of our discussion, we do not consider local governments; nor do we
evaluate property taxes—which are primarily used to fund local governments.
44
See Dylan Mathews, Where Does the Laffer Curve Bend?, WASH. POST. (Aug. 9, 2010, 3:24
PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/08/where_does_the_laffer_curve_be.html
[https://perma.cc/45CE-B3MQ].
45
Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hungerford, Corporate Tax Reform: Should We Really Believe
the Research?, 121 TAX NOTES 419, 422 (2008).
42
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Governments that care about the welfare of their citizens should set
tax rates well below their revenue-maximizing levels.46 This is in part
because the distortionary costs that result from a tax rate are thought to
grow exponentially with the tax rate.47 The detrimental impact to national
welfare from these distortionary costs thus becomes disproportionately
large as a tax rate approaches its national revenue-maximizing level.48
Consequently, showing that a state tax rate has exceeded its national
revenue-maximizing level has powerful implications. At least in theory,
showing this implies that the federal government could promote overall
national welfare simply by paying a state government to decrease its tax
rate. Doing so would produce a “win, win, win”—for the federal
government, for the state government, and for taxpayers. The federal
government would “win” because the cost of paying the state government
to reduce its tax rate would be less than the net revenue gain to the federal
government (even after subtracting the cost of compensating other state
governments for their revenue loss). The state government would similarly
“win” because the amount of the payment received from the federal
government would be more than the revenue the state government would
relinquish by reducing its tax rate. Finally, taxpayers would “win” both
because they would pay less in taxes and because overall distortionary
costs would lessen.
Moreover, if the federal government cares to spend its revenue to
promote national welfare, then the federal government can also produce a
“win, win, win” by paying state governments to reduce tax rates even to
somewhat below their national revenue-maximizing levels. For the goal of
national welfare maximization, the optimal setting for state tax rates is their
national welfare-maximizing levels, which should fall well below the
setting for their national revenue-maximizing levels. To be sure,
determining the national welfare-maximizing levels for tax rates requires
contestable assumptions about the nature of welfare. Accordingly, showing
that a tax rate has exceeded its national revenue-maximizing level is a more
clear-cut result. Nevertheless, showing that a tax rate is set close to its
national revenue-maximizing level is also a powerful result, as this implies
that the tax rate has very likely exceeded its national welfare-maximizing
level.

46

Regulatory taxes (alternatively called corrective taxes or Pigovian taxes) are an exception to this
general rule.
47
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48
See Gamage, supra note 27, at 43 (“[A]s tax rates are increased close to their revenuemaximizing points, the ratio of marginal distortionary costs per revenue raised approaches infinity.”).
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In the remainder of this Part, we first explain some of our findings
conceptually with illustrative graphs. Next, we proceed to discuss our
model for approximating tax cannibalization. Finally, we apply that model
to assess the current top state-level corporate income, capital gains, and
ordinary income tax rates.
A.

A Conceptual Explanation of Why Tax Cannibalization
Is Positive and Large

Below, we graphically illustrate how taxpayers respond to taxation
and how this generates economic waste. To begin with, in Figure 1, we
show taxpayers responding to a federal tax rate through distortionary
behaviors that reduce the size of the tax base—shrinking the tax base from
Q0 to Q1.49 The gray triangle depicts the economic resources (or welfare)
destroyed by the costs that taxpayers incur to engage in tax-reduction
behaviors.
FIGURE 1: ONLY FEDERAL TAX RATE

49
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So, then, what happens when we add a state-level tax that piggybacks
on the federal tax base? As Figure 2 shows, below, adding a state-level tax
raises the overall tax rate and thus induces taxpayers to engage in more taxreduction behaviors that further shrink the tax base—from Q1 to Q2.
FIGURE 2: STATE AND FEDERAL TAX RATES, WITH ONLY VERTICAL DISTORTIONS

The additional economic waste that results from the state tax rate is
depicted by the combination of the checkered rectangle (federal revenue
loss) and the black triangle. Assuming that the state government does not
care about the effect of the state tax rate on federal revenues, the checkered
rectangle measures the vertical externalities generated by the state tax rate.
Whereas the state government should care about the economic waste
depicted by the black triangle, the state government may not care about the
economic waste depicted by the checkered rectangle, because that
economic waste takes the form of diminished federal government revenues.
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The federal government currently levies tax rates on corporate
income, ordinary income, and capital gains that are much higher than those
levied by any state government. As Figure 2 illustrates, when the federal
tax rate is larger than a state’s tax rate, most of the economic waste
generated by the state’s tax rate affects the federal government (in the form
of revenue loss) rather than the state government.
So far our figures have only shown vertical distortions, not horizontal
distortions. Fully adding horizontal distortions to the figures would create
excessive clutter. Accordingly, Figure 3, below, depicts only the key
aspects of horizontal distortions—illustrating that horizontal distortions
reduce the state-level tax base but do not similarly affect the federal-level
tax base.
FIGURE 3: STATE AND FEDERAL TAX RATES, WITH
BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DISTORTIONS
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The gray square (labeled HD) shows horizontal distortions shrinking
the state-level tax base but not the federal-level tax base.50 Although not
shown, some portion of this horizontal-distortions square should increase
the tax base of other states, thereby generating horizontal externalities. To
the extent that horizontal distortions generate horizontal externalities (in the
form of increased revenue to other state governments), this can serve to
alleviate the tax cannibalization problem. Yet horizontal distortions can
also serve to exacerbate the tax cannibalization problem.
To understand why, tax cannibalization should be conceived of in
terms of how it biases a state government’s tax policymaking. To this end,
we measure tax cannibalization as the aggregate revenue loss to other
governments per dollar of tax revenue raised by an acting state government
from its tax rate (in other words, the ratio of the revenue loss to other
governments over the revenue gain to the acting state government). By
measuring the size of the net externality in terms of the acting state’s
revenue gain, this ratio indicates what portion of the overall impact of a
state’s tax rate does not affect the acting state government directly. This
ratio thus measures the extent to which tax cannibalization biases the acting
state government’s tax policymaking.
Accordingly, by shrinking the acting state’s tax base, horizontal
distortions reduce the denominator of this ratio and thereby potentially
exacerbate the tax cannibalization problem. Put another way, the smaller
that state-level revenues become as a result of horizontal distortions, the
larger the ratio of vertical externalities over state-level revenues, and the
greater the bias to state-government tax policymaking.
To see this on the figures, compare the checkered rectangle to the
diagonal-patterned rectangle. Because the federal tax rate is much larger
than the state tax rate, and because vertical distortionary responsiveness is
shown as substantial, the checkered rectangle is rather large by comparison
to the diagonal-patterned rectangle. This illustrates that federal-level
revenue loss is rather large by comparison to state-level revenue gain. This
portrays why tax cannibalization is such a major problem within the
context of fiscal federalism. Further note that because the gray horizontaldistortions square shrinks only the diagonal-patterned rectangle, the
checkered rectangle becomes even larger by comparison. This portrays
how horizontal distortions can exacerbate the tax cannibalization problem.
50

To the extent that taxpayers incur costs to engage in horizontal-distortionary tax-reduction
behaviors, these costs might well shrink the federal tax base in addition to the state’s tax base. To
maintain simplicity, we do not show this aspect of horizontal distortions, nor do we incorporate this into
our model. Incorporating this effect into our analysis would increase our approximations of the
magnitude of the tax cannibalization problem, making this a conservative assumption for our purposes.
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To further develop these insights, the remainder of this Part discusses
and applies our model for drawing inferences from the existing empirical
literature. Before proceeding, though, let us briefly foreshadow the key
points of this analysis.
The existing empirical literature implies that there is substantial
vertical distortionary responsiveness to tax rates on corporate income,
capital gains, and (to a much lesser extent) ordinary income. By contrast,
the empirical literature does not provide much in the way of solid evidence
as to the possible magnitude of horizontal distortionary responsiveness to
state-level tax rates on these bases. Nevertheless, because the empirical
literature implies that the vertical distortionary responsiveness is
substantial, and because federal-level tax rates on these bases are much
larger than any state’s tax rates, we infer that it is implausible that
horizontal distortionary responsiveness could be large enough for
horizontal externalities to counteract the impact of vertical externalities. As
we will demonstrate, were horizontal distortionary responsiveness so large,
this would imply that many state governments have currently set their statelevel tax rates near or above their acting state revenue-maximizing levels.
We do not know of any serious analysis suggesting that this is the case, and
we think it exceedingly unlikely that this could be true without it being a
major topic of academic and policy discussion.51 Overall, then, we conclude
that tax cannibalization is very large for the current top state-level tax rates
on corporate income and capital gains, and that tax cannibalization is rather
large for the top state-level tax rates on ordinary income.
B.

Our Model for Approximating Tax Cannibalization

We now discuss our model for approximating tax cannibalization. Our
model is not designed to calculate the precise levels for national revenuemaximizing tax rates. Instead, our model relies on a number of simplifying
assumptions and the model’s outputs should be viewed as ballpark
approximations. Nevertheless, these approximations still demonstrate that
tax cannibalization is currently positive and large.
Our model uses five empirical inputs: (a) the effective marginal
federal tax rate (“Federal Tax Rate” or TRF), (b) the effective marginal
tax rate of the other states to which taxable activity relocates through
horizontal distortions (“Other States’ Tax Rate” or TRO), (c) the effective
marginal tax rate of the acting state (“Acting State’s Tax Rate” or TRA),
(d) the semi-elasticity of the vertical distortions induced by adjusting the
acting state’s tax rate (“Vertical Distortions” or VD), and (e) the semi51
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elasticity of the horizontal distortions induced by adjusting the acting
state’s tax rate (“Horizontal Distortions” or HD).
The model then produces as outputs: (a) the acting state’s revenuemaximizing level for its tax rate (TRARM), (b) the national revenuemaximizing level for the acting state’s tax rate (TRNRM), and (c) the
marginal tax cannibalization at any specified level for the acting state’s tax
rate (MTC).
In the Technical Appendix accompanying this Article, we derive
expressions for these outputs in terms of the five empirical parameters used
as inputs. In the remainder of this Section, we clarify some aspects of our
model and its key assumptions.
First, we define “marginal tax cannibalization” as the difference
between the federal government’s revenue loss and other state
governments’ revenue gain, all per marginal $1.00 of revenue raised by the
acting state from its tax rate.52 In other words, marginal tax cannibalization
expresses the net dollars of revenue loss to other governments per
incremental dollar of revenue raised by the acting state from its tax rate.
Marginal tax cannibalization is thus positive when vertical externalities
exceed horizontal externalities, and is negative when horizontal
externalities exceed vertical externalities. Marginal tax cannibalization
equals one at the national revenue-maximizing level for the acting state’s
tax rate (TRNRM), and exceeds one above that level.
Proceeding to consider our model’s inputs, the model uses semielasticity measurements as its inputs for vertical and horizontal distortions
(VD and HD). These semi-elasticity measurements indicate the percentage
shrinkage to a tax base induced by a one percentage point hike to the tax
rate.
Semi-elasticity measurements are commonly used in the empirical
literature on corporate income tax rates.53 This is in contrast to elasticity
measurements, which are more commonly used in the empirical literature
on ordinary income and capital gains tax rates.54

52

We limit our analysis to scenarios wherein the acting state’s tax rate is below its acting state
revenue-maximizing level (the peak of the Laffer curve), such that the marginal revenue the acting state
raises from its tax rate is positive.
53
E.g., Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A
Review of the Empirical Literature, 35 FISCAL STUD. 421, 429 (2014); de Mooij & Ederveen, supra note
12, at 694–95.
54
The reason for this difference is that semi-elasticity measurements are better suited to
considering multiple governments’ tax rates over the same time period, whereas elasticity
measurements are better suited to considering a single government’s tax rates over multiple time
periods. The most reliable empirical estimates of corporate income tax responsiveness come from
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Elasticity measurements indicate the percentage change to a tax base
induced by a percentage change to the tax rate. Elasticity measurements
can be converted into semi-elasticity measurements, and vice versa, but
only with respect to a specific tax rate.55 This is because both semielasticity and elasticity measurements can vary with tax rates, and the two
sorts of measurements vary differently.56 Either sort of measurement is thus
only fully reliable when assessing small tax rate changes from tax rates
close to those from which the measurements were estimated. Nevertheless,
as is commonly done in the economics literature on corporate income tax
rates, our model treats semi-elasticity measurements as fixed.57 This
simplifying assumption is necessary because we lack useful information
about how either the semi-elasticity or the elasticity estimates reported by
the existing literature might vary with tax rates.
Finally, perhaps our model’s most significant simplifying assumption
is that the model considers only a single tax base. The model then uses as
inputs only a single federal tax rate, a single tax rate for the acting state,
and a single tax rate for the other states. A more developed model would
ideally use multiple tax rates for all of these, and also multiple
corresponding measurements for vertical and horizontal distortions. This
would be more exact because adjusting the tax rate on one tax base can
affect other tax bases. However, we lack the empirical information needed
to estimate the possible magnitude of these potential tax-base-interaction
effects, and so there would be no reliable way to apply this more developed
model based on the existing empirical literature.58
studies of multiple governments’ tax rates, whereas the most reliable empirical estimates of ordinary
income and capital gains tax responsiveness come from studies of multiple time periods.
55
100 divided by the tax rate, all multiplied by the elasticity measurement, yields the equivalent
semi-elasticity measurement with respect to that tax rate.
56
Compare Dharmapala, supra note 53, at 429–30 (discussing how semi-elasticity measurements
can vary with tax rates), with Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Influences on Economic
Efficiency and Tax Revenues, and Implications for Tax Policy, in TAX POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
2000S 101, 129 (Alan D. Viard ed., 2009) (discussing how elasticity measurements can vary with tax
rates).
57
E.g., Dharmapala, supra note 53; de Mooij & Ederveen, supra note 12. It is more common in the
literature on ordinary income and capital gains tax rates to treat elasticity measurements as fixed. In any
case, because state tax rates are small in comparison to federal tax rates, we mostly assess what might
be thought of as relatively small changes to the overall tax rate, thus limiting the impact of this
simplifying assumption. As another (related) simplifying assumption, we assume that there are no
interactions between measurements of vertical and horizontal distortions, such that it is valid to add our
measurements together to calculate the aggregate marginal distortionary responses to state-level tax
rates. Interactions between these measurements could point in either direction and we are not aware of
any data for estimating possible interaction effects, so again this is a necessary simplifying assumption.
For related discussion, see de Mooij & Ederveen, supra note 12, at 695.
58
We suspect that fully incorporating tax-base-interaction effects would more likely than not
reduce our model’s approximations for the national revenue-maximizing levels for the acting state’s tax
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C.

Approximating Tax Cannibalization for
State Corporate Income Tax Rates

The largest source of uncertainty in our model’s approximations
comes from uncertainty about the empirical parameters for vertical and
horizontal distortions. Looking first to corporate income tax rates, the
existing empirical literature reports a range of possible estimates for
vertical distortions and only reports suggestive evidence for horizontal
distortions.
Vertical distortions are induced by the overall tax rate on corporate
income—the aggregate federal and state tax rates. We thus look to the
literature on federal-level corporate income tax rates for estimates of the
vertical distortions induced by state-level corporate income tax rates.59 A
rates, thus potentially magnifying our model’s approximations of the tax cannibalization problem. The
case for inferring this is probably strongest with respect to corporate income tax rates. This is primarily
because hiking a state-level corporate income tax rate would almost certainly result in at least some
amount of negative tax-base-interaction effects in terms of shrinking other federal-level tax bases, such
as personal income tax bases. For instance, to the extent that hiking a state-level corporate income tax
rate induces reduction to domestic capital stock or causes corporations to move jobs overseas, this
would almost certainly result in at least some shrinkage to the federal personal income tax bases.
Weighing against this, hiking a state-level corporate income tax rate could also have a positive taxbase-interaction effect on the federal personal income tax bases to the extent that the corporate income
tax serves as a backstop to the personal income tax, but this positive effect is almost certainly much
smaller than the negative effects under the current settings for the federal government’s tax rates. Also
weighing against this is that hiking a state-level corporate income tax rate could induce negative taxbase-interaction effects with respect to other state-level tax bases through horizontal distortions.
However, because the federal government’s tax rates on the personal income tax base are several times
larger than any state’s tax rates, and because negative horizontal tax-base-interaction effects would also
reduce the acting state’s revenue-maximizing tax rate and thereby additionally reduce that state’s
national revenue-maximizing tax rate, net negative horizontal tax-base-interaction effects would need to
be improbably large relative to net negative vertical tax-base-interaction effects for these factors to
imply that our model overestimates (rather than underestimates) tax cannibalization, at least with
respect to corporate income tax rates. How these conflicting vectors might weigh out is less clear with
respect to capital gains tax rates, primarily because there is much stronger evidence that capital gains
tax rates serve as a significant backstop to ordinary income tax rates under the current federal rate
structure. However, to the extent that capital gains tax rates induce even a small decrease to savings or
investment behaviors, the negative tax-base interaction effects of this with respect to the federal
government’s other tax bases would quite possibly overpower the conflicting vectors (as with our
discussion of corporate income tax rates above).
59
State-level corporate income tax bases deviate from the federal government’s corporate income
tax-base-definition rules in some important ways (especially in regard to foreign source income), and so
taxpayers might respond somewhat differently to state-level corporate income tax rates than to the
federal rates. However, state-level corporate income taxes are vulnerable to all of the same major
vertical distortionary responses as is the federal corporate income tax. (For instance, shifting reported
profits to a foreign jurisdiction to reduce federal-level corporate income tax liabilities should also
simultaneously reduce state-level corporate income tax liabilities.) Thus, state-level corporate income
tax bases mostly overlap with the federal corporate income tax base, in the ways that are most important
for our analysis. Moreover, we are not aware of any empirical literature helpful for assessing whether
and how vertical distortionary responses to state-level corporate income tax rates might differ from
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review of this literature by the economists Ruud de Mooij and Sjef
Ederveen reports an estimated semi-elasticity for the overall vertical
distortions induced by corporate income tax rates of 3.1.60 This aggregate
semi-elasticity measurement is further supported by research from the
economist Kimberly Clausing.61
Other economists, however, have argued that these semi-elasticity
measurements are probably too high. For instance, Dhammika Dharmapala
reviews the empirical literature for the most important component of these
reported semi-elasticity measurements (profit shifting) and reports an
estimate for this component significantly smaller than the one relied upon
by de Mooij and Ederveen.62 Also, Jane Gravelle and Thomas Hungerford
have argued that aggregate semi-elasticities are likely much lower than
those reported in the work of de Mooij and Ederveen or that of Clausing.63
More recently, a draft paper by Laura Kawano and Joel Slemrod suggests
that the aggregate semi-elasticity measurement might be around 2.64
those to federal corporate income tax rates. As a simplifying assumption, we thus treat the vertical
distortionary responses to federal- and state-level tax rates as being the same. Were we to try to relax
this assumption (and thereby complicate our analysis), we might start with the observation that we have
gathered from discussions with tax lawyers who advise on corporate tax planning transactions that the
models used to evaluate the tax implications of tax planning by multinationals often rely on blended
state-level tax rates rather on actual state-level tax rates. This suggests that the corporate tax rate set by
each state government may have much smaller impact on state-level revenues, and much larger negative
impact on the federal government and other state governments’ revenues, than our model implies. To
the extent so, our model may considerably underestimate the magnitude of the tax cannibalization
problem for state-level corporate income taxes.
60
De Mooij & Ederveen, supra note 12, at 695. In contrast to de Mooij and Ederveen, and to some
of the other research we cite below, note that we list semi-elasticity estimates using positive numbers,
thus interpreting these estimates as measurements of tax base shrinkage rather than as estimates of tax
base growth. We translate the semi-elasticity estimates reported in the literature to our usage as
appropriate. Also note that these estimates are based on international data, as is almost all of the useful
empirical literature on corporate income tax responsiveness.
61
Kimberly A. Clausing, The Revenue Effects of Multinational Firm Income Shifting, 130 TAX
NOTES 1580, 1584 (2011) (“That yields a semi-elasticity of [3.3] . . . consistent with studies reviewed in
de Mooij and Ederveen . . . .”). In a more recent draft paper Clausing reports that “[t]he semi-elasticities
range from [1.85 to 4.61], with an average estimate of [2.92].” Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of
Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond 11 (June 17, 2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685442
[https://perma.cc/TM5-ZADT] [hereinafter Clausing, The Effect].
62
Dharmapala, supra note 53, at 432. But see Clausing, The Effect, supra note 61, at 6–7 (arguing
against Dharmapala’s interpretation of the data).
63
Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 45, at 426 (finding smaller estimates of responsiveness than
Clausing’s).
64
Kawano and Slemrod suggest that the revenue-maximizing tax rate for “large, open countries”
might be 50%. Laura Kawano & Joel Slemrod, How Do Corporate Tax Bases Change When Corporate
Tax Rates Change? With Implications for the Tax Rate Elasticity of Corporate Tax Revenues 23 (Aug.
29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2559858
[https://perma.cc/R3ZC-29AG]. This implies a semi-elasticity of 2, as the revenue-maximizing tax rate
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Turning to horizontal distortions, the existing empirical literature
offers only suggestive evidence. The most relevant estimates for our
purposes are probably those of Xavier Giroud and Joshua Rauh, who
estimate the effect of state-level corporate income tax rates on the number
of business establishments within a state and also on employment by
business establishments within a state.65 Their results for employment could
be taken to suggest an overall semi-elasticity for state-level corporate
income tax rates (including both vertical and horizontal distortions) of
perhaps 5.8.66 Especially relevant for our purposes is their finding that
approximately half of their estimated effects result from economic activity
relocating across state lines,67 potentially implying that the horizontal
distortions induced by state-level corporate income tax rates might be of
similar magnitude to the vertical distortions. Based on the overall semielasticity estimate of 5.8, this could suggest that vertical and horizontal
distortions might each be around 2.968—a result similar to de Mooij and
Ederveen’s and Clausing’s estimates for vertical distortions.
is given by 100 divided by the semi-elasticity measurement, as explained in de Mooij & Ederveen,
supra note 12, at 681. Note that Kawano and Slemrod stress the uncertainty in the research and how the
factors they consider “attenuate” the larger semi-elasticity estimates implied by prior research (such as
Clausing’s). Accordingly, although a semi-elasticity estimate of 2 can be inferred from their analysis,
they do not directly report this or any other estimates.
65
Giroud & Rauh, supra note 11.
66
They report that “the elasticity of C corporation employment for a given establishment is 0.4
with respect to the state corporate income tax rate.” Id. at 4. This corresponds with a semi-elasticity of
about 5.8 at what they report as the mean corporate income tax rate in their study of 6.85% (because
(100 / 6.85) x 0.4 = ~ 5.8). Id. at 19–20. The study’s estimates likely measure only a portion of the
aggregate distortions induced by state-level corporate income tax rates (implying that this estimated
overall semi-elasticity may be too low for our purposes). However, the study’s estimates are derived
from a sample of firms for which responsiveness is likely to be especially high (implying that this
estimated overall semi-elasticity may be too high for our purposes). Id. at 31–32. We thus view this
estimate as being only suggestive for our purposes, although we view it as the best estimate currently
available.
67
Id. at 6.
68
Some other studies support similarly large estimates for the aggregate distortions induced by
state-level corporate income tax rates. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Altered States: Taxes and the
Location of Foreign Direct Investment in America, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1076, 1076 (1996) (“While it is
not quite correct to extrapolate these figures to conclude that increasing a state tax rate from 6 percent
to 8 percent would reduce total investment by 20 percent, the estimated effects are nevertheless large
and important . . . .”); Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato & Owen Zidar, Who Benefits from State Corporate
Tax Cuts? A Local Labor Markets Approach with Heterogeneous Firms 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20289, 2014) (“We find that a 1% cut in local business taxes increases
the number of local establishments by 3 to 4% over a ten-year period.”). Yet the findings of other
studies suggest relatively small horizontal distortions. See Hines, supra, at 1079 (“Analysts typically
find little or no effect of subnational taxes on the location of business activity.”). For a review of the
literature, see Suárez Serrato & Zidar, supra, at 6 n.10. Overall, it is difficult to infer what these studies
imply about the likely magnitude of horizontal distortions, so we show a relatively wide range in Table
1.
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Regardless of what perspective one might take on the debates over
this empirical evidence, our purpose in this discussion is only to explain
what the range of estimates reported by the existing empirical literature
implies about the possible magnitude of tax cannibalization. In Table 1,
below, we show our model’s outputs with respect to a range of vertical
distortion measurements of between 2 and 3, and also 1 to depict the
implications of a low-end measurement. We then show how the model’s
outputs vary with respect to a (wider) range of measurement for horizontal
distortions, focusing on the range of between 0 and 4, but also showing 8 to
depict the implications of a high-end outlier measurement.
Next, we turn to the other empirical input parameters in our model.
We set the federal government’s top statutory corporate tax rate of 35% as
our input for the federal tax rate (TRF).69
We do not know of any data source or prior research that directly
estimates a value for the other states’ tax rate (TRO). However, it stands to
reason that the majority of taxable activity relocated through horizontal
distortions moves to states with below-median tax rates. We thus use 4.4%
as our input for the other states’ tax rate,70 an estimate equal to two-thirds
of the approximate median state-level corporate income tax rate of 6.6%.71
Finally, for the acting state’s tax rate (TRA), state-level statutory
corporate tax rates range from 12% (Iowa) to 0% (six states that do not
levy corporate income taxes).72 Table 1 shows outputs for Pennsylvania’s
tax rate of 9.99% (the second highest) and for California’s tax rate of
8.84% (the tenth highest).
Based on these inputs, Table 1 shows our model’s outputs across a
range of measurements for vertical and horizontal distortions:

69

The appropriate value here is the effective marginal tax rate with respect to vertical distortions,
not the effective average tax rate (which may be much lower). The statutory federal tax rate should thus
be a reasonable proxy. Although statutory federal corporate tax rates are graduated, the vast majority of
taxable corporate income is subject to this 35% statutory marginal tax rate. In any case, adjusting this
parameter within the range of plausibility does not dramatically alter the results.
70
This is somewhat arbitrary, but adjusting this parameter within the range of plausibility does not
dramatically alter the results.
71
We derive the median rate from RAYMOND J. KEATING, SMALL BUSINESS &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, SMALL BUSINESS TAX INDEX 2014: BEST TO WORST STATE TAX
SYSTEMS FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUSINESS 8 (2014), http://www.sbecouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/BTI2014Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU5H-8ZXV].
72
We take all our figures for state-level corporate tax rates from State Corporate Income Tax Rates
as of January 1, 2014, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-corporateincome-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/XLS2-ADCW].
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TABLE 1: APPROXIMATING TAX CANNIBALIZATION FOR CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES73
Horizontal Distortions (HD)

Vertical Distortions (VD)

1.0

2.0

2.5

3.0

0
100.0
65.0
$0.38
$0.39
50.0
15.0
$0.85
$0.87
40.0
5.0
$1.12
$1.17
33.3
N/A
$1.43
$1.50

1
50.0
34.7
$0.37
$0.38
33.3
11.5
$0.89
$0.94
28.6
4.8
$1.20
$1.28
25.0
N/A
$1.56
$1.68

2
33.3
24.6
$0.36
$0.37
25.0
9.7
$0.95
$1.02
22.2
4.7
$1.31
$1.43
20.0
N/A
$1.72
$1.92

3
25.0
19.6
$0.34
$0.36
20.0
8.6
$1.02
$1.13
18.2
4.7
$1.45
$1.65
16.7
N/A
$1.95
$2.29

4
20.0
16.5
$0.31
$0.35
16.7
7.9
$1.12
$1.31
15.4
4.6
$1.64
$1.99
14.3
N/A N/A
$2.29
$2.91

8
11.1
11.1
-$0.01
-$0.02
10.0
6.5
$3.00
$348.00
9.5
4.5
$7.28
N/A
9.1
N/A
N/A
N/A

ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 8.84%
MargTaxCann ($) at PA tax rate of 9.99%

For the first takeaway from Table 1, note that marginal tax
cannibalization (MTC) is positive for every cell except for the outliers,
where vertical distortions are 1 and horizontal distortions are 8. This is
because vertical externalities are greater than horizontal externalities so
!"
long as the ratio of the federal tax rate over the other states’ tax rate (!"! )
!"

!

exceeds the ratio of horizontal distortions over vertical distortions ( !" ).74
With a federal tax rate of 35%, and with other states’ tax rate of 4.4%, this
means that horizontal distortions would need to be almost eight times larger
than vertical distortions for horizontal externalities to exceed vertical
externalities.
We thus infer that vertical externalities almost certainly exceed
horizontal externalities for state-level corporate income tax rates. This is
because a vertical distortions measurement of 1 seems improbably low
based on the range reported in the existing empirical literature, and a
horizontal distortions measurement of 8 seems improbably high.
The primary reason why a horizontal distortions measurement as high
as 8 seems improbable is because this would imply that some state
governments have set their current corporate income tax rates close to or
above their acting state revenue-maximizing levels. This can be seen in the
far right column of Table 1, where the TRARM values are all below Iowa’s
tax rate of 12% and where the values associated with the more plausible
vertical distortions measurements are also at or below Pennsylvania’s and
73

When the acting state’s tax rate exceeds the revenue-maximizing level for the acting state
(TRARM), marginal tax cannibalization (MTC) becomes infinite. We thus put “N/A” in those boxes to
indicate “Not Applicable.” Also, when VD is 3, the federal tax rate is above its revenue-maximizing
level, such that the TRNRM is negative. We thus put “N/A” in those boxes also.
74
In other words, vertical externalities exceed horizontal externalities (such that MTC is positive)
!"
!"
so long as ! > . This is readily derived from Expression (C) in the Technical Appendix.
!"!

!"
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other states’ tax rates. If any current state-level corporate income tax rate
were set close to their acting state revenue-maximizing levels, we would
almost certainly have heard some indications of this in discussions of the
revenue estimates for state-level corporate income tax reforms.75 That we
have not heard any such indication cements our confidence that vertical
externalities currently exceed horizontal externalities for state-level
corporate income tax rates. More generally, because the federal
government’s corporate income tax rate is so much higher than state-level
corporate income tax rates, horizontal distortions would need to be
implausibly big relative to vertical distortions for tax cannibalization to not
be positive.
So, then, is this positive tax cannibalization sufficiently large for any
state-level corporate income tax rates to exceed their national revenuemaximizing levels? As Table 1 shows, if vertical distortions are 2 (as
suggested by Slemrod and Kawano’s analysis), and if horizontal distortions
are also 2, then our model implies that the national revenue-maximizing
state tax rate is 9.7%. Iowa’s current top tax rate of 12%, Pennsylvania’s of
9.99%, the District of Columbia’s of 9.975%, and Minnesota’s of 9.8%,
would thus all exceed their national revenue-maximizing levels. At
Pennsylvania’s current tax rate, other governments would lose $1.02 of
revenue from tax cannibalization for every marginal $1.00 raised by
Pennsylvania.
By comparison, if horizontal distortions are 3, and vertical distortions
are 2, then the national revenue-maximizing tax rate would fall to 8.6%,
implying that the top corporate income tax rates currently levied in Illinois
(9.5%), Alaska (9.4%), Rhode Island (9%), New Jersey (9%), Connecticut
(9%), Maine (8.93%), California (8.84%), and Delaware (8.7%) would all
also exceed their national revenue-maximizing levels. At Pennsylvania’s
current tax rate, other governments would then lose approximately $1.13 of
75

On this point, note that state governments are typically very concerned with how adjusting state
tax rates affects the acting state’s revenues (in contrast to federal or other states’ revenues). Indeed,
economists employed by state governments regularly devise revenue estimates to estimate the impact
that proposals for raising or lowering state tax rates would have on the acting state’s revenues, and these
revenue estimates are often then critically reviewed by other economists working in think tanks,
advocacy organizations, and academic institutions. In the conclusion to this Article, we explain that the
prior invisibility of tax cannibalization likely arises at least in part from state governments lacking
reasons to estimate how adjusting state-level tax rates affects federal revenues. The opposite is true for
how state-level tax rates affect revenues in the acting state, as state legislatures need revenue estimates
in order to pass budgets and to comply with balanced budget requirements, and other state financial
officials similarly need estimates in order to monitor compliance with balanced budget requirements
and to fulfill their responsibilities with respect to bond issuances. It would be strongly against the
interests of a state government to set a tax rate above its acting state revenue-maximizing level, and
state government officials know this well.
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revenue from tax cannibalization for every marginal $1.00 raised by
Pennsylvania. Moreover, these approximations were all based on what we
take to be a lower point in the range of reported estimates for vertical
distortions.
We consider 2.5 to be a plausible midpoint estimate for vertical
distortions, as this estimate is slightly less than halfway between Slemrod
and Kawano’s (2) and de Mooij and Edverdeen’s and Clausing’s (3.1). If
vertical distortions are 2.5 or greater, then our model implies that top
corporate income tax rates currently exceed their national revenuemaximizing levels in the majority of the states. Moreover, this result holds
for any plausible measurement of horizontal distortions.
For example, if vertical distortions are 2.5 and if horizontal distortions
are 3, then the implied national revenue-maximizing tax rate is 4.7%—well
below the median state-level corporate income tax rate of 6.6%. At
California’s current tax rate of 8.84%, other governments would then lose
$1.45 of revenue from tax cannibalization for every marginal $1.00 of
revenue raised by California. At Pennsylvania’s current tax rate of 9.99%,
other governments would lose $1.65 of revenue from tax cannibalization
for every marginal $1.00 of revenue raised by Pennsylvania.
Consequently, based on mid-range estimates from the empirical
literature, our model implies that the current top corporate income tax rates
in at least some states probably exceed their national revenue-maximizing
levels. Indeed, this is quite possibly the case for the majority of states.
Furthermore, even much lower estimates for vertical distortions still
imply that the tax cannibalization problem is positive and large. For
instance, suppose one believed that the vertical distortions caused by state
corporate income tax rates were as low as 1.76 Suppose as well that one
believed that horizontal distortions were three times the magnitude of
vertical distortions. Even in such a case, at California’s tax rate of 8.84%,
other governments would then lose $0.34 of revenue from tax
cannibalization for every marginal $1.00 of revenue raised by California.
An additional takeaway is worth emphasizing. Note that, in the
leftmost column of Table 1, where horizontal distortions are 0, the acting
76

For instance, because many large multinationals have already adopted water’s-edge elections, an
increase in the corporate income tax rate of one state may not impact all worldwide income for some
firms. (We are grateful to Steve Sheffrin for making this point.) Or perhaps state-level tax rates are less
salient than federal-level tax rates; for general discussions of tax salience, see David Gamage, On the
Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mechanisms and Limiting Factors, 41 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 173 (2013); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011); Andrew T. Hayashi, Brent K. Nakamura & David
Gamage, Experimental Evidence of Tax Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax
Aversion, or Complexity?, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 203 (2013).
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state’s revenue-maximizing tax rate (TRARM) is equal to what the federal
government’s revenue-maximizing tax rate would be if the state-level taxes
were all 0. The difference between each set of TRARM and TRNRM values in
the first column is thus 35, equal to the federal government’s tax rate.
Now consider how the values for both TRARM and TRNRM then become
lower within each row as horizontal distortions become positive and larger.
This depicts how state-level corporate income tax rates are less efficient
than are federal-level corporate income tax rates, to the extent of horizontal
distortions. Whereas the federal-level corporate income tax rate only
induces vertical distortions, state-level corporate income tax rates induce
both vertical and horizontal distortions. This illustrates the logic behind the
“classic theoretical result” of the fiscal federalism literature—that taxation
of mobile tax bases is most efficiently handled by the federal government.77
Building on the newer vertical externalities literature, we show that state
governments face incentives to tax these bases anyway—despite the
relative inefficiency—because much of the cost from their doing so is
borne by the federal government. Indeed, we further show that these
incentives are so strong within the context of contemporary U.S. fiscal
federalism that at least some state governments’ current top corporate
income and capital gains tax rates likely exceed their national revenuemaximizing levels.
D.

Approximating Tax Cannibalization for State Capital Gains Tax Rates

The analysis for capital gains and for ordinary income tax rates is less
straightforward, because the federal government and many state
governments levy progressive schedules of tax rates on these tax bases. To
keep the exposition manageable, we only show our model’s
approximations with respect to taxpayers within the top federal rate
bracket.78

77

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
By comparison, our model’s approximations for tax cannibalization are significantly lower for
taxpayers within the 15% federal capital gains brackets, such that state-level capital gains tax rates are
less likely to exceed their national revenue-maximizing levels with respect to these taxpayers. However,
tax cannibalization almost certainly remains strongly positive for these taxpayers, with at least some
state-level top tax rates quite probably still exceeding their national revenue-maximizing levels
(depending on the measurements used for vertical and horizontal distortions). Thus, because the 15%
federal capital gains bracket begins at relatively low income ranges, and because most states’ capital
gains brackets are at least mildly progressive, this caveat does not dramatically limit the applicability of
our approximations for the top state-level capital gains tax rates. In any case, Table 2 shows marginal
tax cannibalization approximations only for California and New Jersey, wherein the top capital gains
tax brackets correspond closely enough with the top federal bracket to obviate this caveat with respect
to those (and also some other) states. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
78
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Looking first to the vertical distortions input, some scholars have
argued that taxing capital gains might substantially reduce savings or
investment behaviors,79 thereby potentially generating very large vertical
distortions. Yet, we and some other scholars are skeptical.80
The more convincing empirical evidence of sizeable vertical
distortions for current capital gains tax rates is based instead on “selective
realization responses.” Numerous studies have demonstrated that
taxpayers’ decisions of whether to realize gains are very responsive to the
capital gains tax rate, especially as a transitory matter but also
persistently.81 Most notably, a recent paper by the staff of both the Joint
Committee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office estimates an
elasticity for distortionary responses from persistent selective realization of
0.75,82 which implies that the semi-elasticity for these vertical distortions is
around 2.99.83 We consider this to be a reasonable midpoint estimate from
the existing empirical literature.84
Turning to the horizontal distortions input, we are not aware of any
existing research that reports estimates for the interstate-mobility-related
effects of capital gains tax rates. The closest suggestive evidence that we
are aware of comes from a handful of studies examining the interstate
mobility responses of high-income taxpayers to state tax rates more
generally. For instance, a paper by the economists Jon Bakija and Joel
Slemrod finds that “a one percentage point increase” in the applicable state79

See, e.g., Christophe Chamley, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with
Infinite Lives, 54 ECONOMETRICA 607, 619 (1986); Kenneth L. Judd, Optimal Taxation and Spending in
General Competitive Growth Models, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1 (1999).
80
For discussion, see Gamage, supra note 29, at 414–17.
81
Tim Dowd et al., New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 511,
511–13 (2015).
82
Id. at 538 (“In this paper, we estimate the elasticities of long-run capital gains with respect to
permanent and transitory tax changes. Adapting a model developed by Burman and Randolph (1994a,
1994b) and extended by Auerbach and Siegel (2000), we estimate elasticities of permanent tax changes
in the range of -0.59 to -1.40, with most estimates about -0.75.”).
83
This is based on a reference tax rate of 25.1%—the sum of the top federal tax rate of 20% (the
rate for much of the time period from when this elasticity estimate was calculated) and the median top
state-level tax rate of 5.1%. Then, 100 divided by 25.1, multiplied by 0.79, yields 3.15.
84
Of course, some other research argues that these vertical distortions are lower. For instance, the
economist Jane Gravelle reports that the elasticity for persistent selective realization responses is likely
at or below 0.5, which implies that the semi-elasticity may be 2 or lower. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41364, CAPITAL GAINS TAX OPTIONS: BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES AND REVENUES
(2010). Conversely, other research argues that these vertical distortions are higher. For instance, the
economist Paul Evans reports a semi-elasticity estimate for selective realization responses of 10, calling
this a “conservative” estimate as compared to his high-end semi-elasticity estimate of 29.78. PAUL
EVANS, IRET CAPITAL GAINS SERIES, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REALIZED CAPITAL GAINS AND
THEIR MARGINAL RATE OF TAXATION, 1976–2004, at 13 (2009), http://iret.org/pub/CapitalGains-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YM2-363X].
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level estate tax rate “is associated with 1.4 percent to 2.7 percent decline in
the number of federal estate tax returns filed in the state.”85 This perhaps
suggests that the semi-elasticity for horizontal distortions might be
somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.4 to 2.7. Another paper reports results
implying “that the effect of New York cutting its marginal tax rate on the
top 1% of earners from 7.5% to 6.85% in 2006 was . . . a [net] 2.1%
increase [in the number of star scientists locating in New York].”86 This
could perhaps suggest that the semi-elasticity for horizontal distortions
might be somewhere near the neighborhood of 3.2.87 However, another
paper reports that horizontal distortions with respect to millionaire
migration may be considerably lower, with the implied semi-elasticity
perhaps being close to 0.15.88 Overall, it is hard to know what to make of
these divergent and only tenuously relevant estimates, but we think a
plausible range for horizontal distortions might perhaps be somewhere
between 0 and 4.
Regardless, as in the previous Section, our purpose here is only to
explain what the range of estimates reported in the existing empirical
literature implies about the possible magnitude of tax cannibalization. In
Table 2 below, we show our model’s outputs with respect to vertical
distortion measurements of 3 and 3.5, while also showing 1 as a low-end
outlier measurement. We then show how the model’s outputs vary with
respect to a (wider) range of measurements for horizontal distortions,
focusing on the range of between 0 and 4, but also showing 7 as a high-end
outlier measurement.
Turning to our model’s other empirical input parameters, we use
23.8% as our input for the federal tax rate (TRF),89 which is the sum of the
20% top statutory federal capital gains tax rate and the 3.8% federal Net

85

Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes? Evidence from Federal
Estate Tax Returns 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645, 2004).
86
Enrico Moretti & Daniel Wilson, The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top
Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21120,
2015).
87
Because 2.1% divided by the difference of 7.5% and 6.85% yields 3.23.
88
See Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence from
Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421, 434 (2016). This study reports a “millionaire population
elasticity” of 0.1. Id. (emphasis omitted). It is unclear what tax rate(s) this elasticity corresponds with,
making it difficult to translate this into a semi-elasticity estimate. At the “optimal tax rate on top
incomes of 68 percent” implied by their analysis, id., this might suggest a semi-elasticity of 0.15 (from
100 divided by 68, then multiplied by 0.1).
89
This should be a reasonable proxy for the top effective marginal tax rate. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text. In any case, adjusting this value within the range of plausibility does not
dramatically alter the results. But remember that we are only showing approximations with respect to
taxpayers who are subject to the top federal rate bracket. See supra note 78.
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Investment Income Tax rate that went into effect in 2013.90 We then use as
our input for other states’ tax rate (TRO) an estimate of 3.4%,91 equal to
two-thirds of the approximate median top state-level capital gains tax rate
of 5.1%.92 Finally, (for TRA), top state-level statutory capital gains tax rates
range from California’s 13.3% to 0% in the nine states that do not levy
capital gains taxes. Table 2 shows outputs for California’s top tax rate of
13.3% (the highest) and for New Jersey’s top tax rate of 8.97% (the fourth
highest).93
Based on all of these inputs, Table 2 shows our model’s outputs
across a range of measurements for vertical and horizontal distortions:
TABLE 2: APPROXIMATING TAX CANNIBALIZATION FOR CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES94

Vertical Distortions (VD)

Horizontal Distortions (HD)

1.0

3.0

3.5

0
100.0
76.2
$0.27
$0.26
33.3
9.5
$1.19
$0.98
28.6
4.8
$1.56
$1.21

1
50.0
39.8
$0.28
$0.25
25.0
8.0
$1.45
$1.06
22.2
4.5
$1.99
$1.34

2
33.3
27.7
$0.28
$0.23
20.0
7.1
$1.93
$1.17
18.2
4.3
$2.85
$1.51

3
25.0
21.6
$0.29
$0.21
16.7
6.5
$3.03
$1.33
15.4
4.1
$5.39
$1.75

4
20.0
18.0
$0.30
$0.18
14.3
6.0
$8.38
$1.55
13.3
4.0
$278.80
$2.13

7
12.5
12.5
N/A
$0.00
10.0
5.2
N/A
$4.62
9.5
3.9
N/A
$10.23

ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%

For the first takeaway from Table 2, we can again see that marginal
tax cannibalization (MTC) is positive for every cell except for the outliers,
where vertical distortions are 1 and horizontal distortions are 7. Thus, for
90

Questions and Answers on the Net Investment Income Tax, IRS (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Net-Investment-Income-Tax-FAQs
[https://perma.cc/TYN3BES9].
91
This is somewhat arbitrary, but (again) adjusting this value within the range of plausibility does
not dramatically alter the results.
92
Both our median estimate and the figures we use for all top state-level capital gains tax rates are
from KEATING, supra note 71, at 6.
93
California’s 13.3% top rate on both capital gains and ordinary income was enacted through
Proposition 30 as a temporary measure taking effect in 2012 and is currently scheduled to expire in
2019, at which point the top tax rate on both capital gains and ordinary income would revert to the prior
10.3%. However, there are numerous proposals currently being circulated to make the Proposition 30
tax hikes permanent. Whether these tax hikes will be allowed to expire is perhaps the central question in
current tax reform debates in California. See CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 30: OFFICIAL TITLE
SUMMARY
(2012),
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/30-title-summ-analysis.pdf
AND
[https://perma.cc/L5VA-5R6Q]; Wayne Winegarden, Regain Golden State’s Luster by Eliminating
Prop. 30, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/
apr/02/prop-30-end/ [https://perma.cc/UUE2-CQ75] (“The tax increases were supposed to be
temporary . . . . But proponents of Prop. 30 . . . now want to renege on that promise and extend the tax
hike.”).
94
As in Table 1, we put “N/A” (for “Not Applicable”) in boxes where MTC is infinite.
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equivalent reasons as in our earlier discussion of corporate income tax
rates,95 we infer that vertical externalities almost certainly exceed
horizontal externalities for top state-level capital gains tax rates. Also, and
as with corporate income taxes, even a very low-end assumption for
vertical distortions (i.e., 1) still results in considerable tax cannibalization,
unless horizontal distortions are implausibly large.
So, is this positive tax cannibalization sufficiently large for any statelevel capital gains tax rates to exceed their national revenue-maximizing
levels? We said earlier that we consider 2.99 to be a reasonable midpoint
estimate for the vertical distortions associated with persistent selective
realization responses. Rounding to an overall vertical distortions
measurement of 3, our model implies that the national revenue-maximizing
state-level capital gains tax rate is probably between 9.5% and 6%
(corresponding with a range of horizontal distortions estimates of between
0 and 4). Even at the 9.5% approximation, the current top capital gains tax
rates levied by California (13.3%), Oregon (9.9%), and Minnesota (9.85%)
would all probably exceed their national revenue-maximizing levels. If
New York City’s capital gains tax rate of 3.88% is added to New York
State’s rate of 8.82%, the combined rate there of 12.7% would also
probably exceed its national revenue-maximizing level.96
At California’s current top tax rate, an overall vertical distortions
estimate of 3 implies that other governments lose somewhere between
$1.19 and $8.38 of revenue through tax cannibalization for every marginal
$1.00 raised by California (again corresponding with a range of horizontal
distortions estimates of between 0 and 4). More generally, if vertical
distortions are at least 3, and if horizontal distortions are at least moderate,
the implied marginal tax cannibalization generated by California’s current
top capital gains tax rate is enormous.
Consequently, based on mid-range estimates from the empirical
literature, our model implies that the current top capital gains tax rates in at
least some states probably exceed their national revenue-maximizing
levels. Moreover, remember that the empirical estimates for vertical
distortions that we discussed earlier were based only on persistent selective
realization responses. If taxpayers also respond to capital gains tax rates in
other ways beyond just through the responses of selective realization (the
basis of our estimates for vertical distortions) and of relocating taxable
95

See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, STATE AND FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS TAX
RATES: HOW HIGH COULD THEY GO? 5 (2012), http://accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/1204-15ACCF-Special-Report-on-Capital-Gains_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YVU-SNYT]
(reporting
“12.7%” as the “[t]op effective long-term state & local tax rate” for New York City).
96
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activity across state lines (horizontal distortions), then the tax
cannibalization problem resulting from current top state-level capital gains
tax rates would be even larger.
For instance, consider if vertical distortions are 3.5 (only somewhat
above the mid-range estimate for persistent selective realization responses
of 2.99). Then, our model would imply that the top capital gains tax rates in
the majority of the states might well currently exceed their national
revenue-maximizing levels.97 Further, our model would then imply that the
marginal tax cannibalization in relatively high-tax areas like California and
New York City would be even more enormous.
E.

Approximating Tax Cannibalization for
State Ordinary Income Tax Rates

We now assess tax cannibalization for the top state-level ordinary
income tax rates. Again, to keep the exposition manageable, we will only
show our model’s approximations with respect to taxpayers in the highest
federal rate bracket.98
However, because the ordinary income rate structure of the federal
income tax is quite progressive, whereas states vary widely in the
progressivity of their income tax rate structures, the top ordinary income
tax rates in some states apply to taxpayers even in the lower federal
ordinary income tax brackets. We thus stress that our approximations for
ordinary income tax rates only necessarily apply with respect to taxpayers
in the top federal rate bracket.99 For this reason, our approximations are
only fully applicable to the current top ordinary income tax rates in states
with relatively progressive rate structures—such as California, New York,
and New Jersey.100 With those caveats, we can proceed to assessing our
model’s inputs.
97

For any plausible horizontal distortions measurement, the implied national revenue-maximizing
tax rate level would then come in below the median top state-level capital gains tax rate of 5.1%, at
least with respect to taxpayers in the top federal rate bracket. Whether this also holds with respect to
taxpayers in the 15% federal capital gains brackets is less clear. See supra note 78.
98
See supra note 78.
99
The approximations reported here would not be all that different from those for taxpayers in the
35% or 33% federal ordinary income tax brackets. However, for lower income taxpayers, especially
those in the 25% and lower federal brackets, the approximations may be considerably different, in part
because the vertical distortions measurement is likely to be lower also.
100
For a compilation of the states’ income tax rate bracket structures, see Income Tax Rates &
Brackets by State, TAX-BRACKETS.ORG, http://www.tax-brackets.org/ [https://perma.cc/LN7H-QS2J].
In addition to California, New York, and New Jersey, the following states also use bracket structures
whereby the top state ordinary income tax rate brackets correspond (closely enough for our purposes)
with the top federal ordinary income tax rate bracket: Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, North Dakota,
Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
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For the vertical distortions measurement, we take our midpoint
estimate from the economists Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez.101 They
report an elasticity measurement of 0.57 for taxpayers with incomes above
$100,000 per year,102 which implies that the semi-elasticity for these
taxpayers is around 1.27103—which we then round down to 1.25. Because
there is some uncertainty in this estimate,104 we show (in Table 3) our
model’s outputs for the range of vertical distortion measurements of 0.75,
1.25, and 1.75.
As with our analysis of capital gains tax rates, the best (suggestive)
estimates we have for horizontal distortions come from the same handful of
studies examining the interstate mobility responses of high-income
taxpayers to state tax rates more generally.105 We thus use the same range
for horizontal distortion measurements (in Table 3) as we previously used
when assessing capital gains tax rates.
For our model’s other empirical input parameters, we use 39.6% as
our input for the federal tax rate (TRF), and 3.6% as our input for the other
states’ tax rate (TRO).106 Then, (for TRA), we show outputs for California’s
top ordinary income tax rate of 13.3% (the highest)107 and for New Jersey’s
of 8.97% (the fourth highest).
Based on all of these inputs, Table 3 shows our model’s outputs across
a range of measurements for vertical and horizontal distortions:

101

Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications,
84 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2002).
102
Id. at 1.
103
This is based on a reference tax rate of 45%—the aggregate of the top federal tax rate of 39.6%
and the median top state-level tax rate of 5.4%. Then, 100 divided by 45, multiplied by 0.57, yields
~1.27. We take all top state-level ordinary income tax rates from KEATING, supra note 71, at 5.
104
The economist Raj Chetty cites to the Gruber and Saez estimate, as well as others, to conclude
that “[t]he empirical literature on the taxable income elasticity has generally found that elasticities are
large (0.5 to 1.5) for individuals in the top percentile of the income distribution.” Raj Chetty, Is the
Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and
Avoidance, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 31, 31 (2009). The Gruber and Saez estimate that we use is
thus toward the lower part of the range cited by Chetty. However, the higher points in Chetty’s range
come from older papers based on somewhat outdated data and methodologies, and so we think the
Gruber and Saez estimate is the most reliable currently available. But note that these estimates are only
for high-income taxpayers. Measured elasticity estimates for low- and middle-income taxpayers are
much smaller. Id.; Gruber & Saez, supra note 101, at 1.
105
See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
106
The logic behind these numbers is equivalent to that in our discussions of these inputs for
assessing corporate income and capital gains tax rates. See supra notes 70–72, 91–93 and
accompanying text. Accordingly, the 3.6% other states’ tax rate estimate comes from two-thirds of the
median top state-level ordinary income tax rate of 5.4%. See KEATING, supra note 71, at 5.
107
But see supra note 93.
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Vertical Distortions (VD)

TABLE 3: APPROXIMATING TAX CANNIBALIZATION FOR ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATES108

0.75

1.25

1.75

0
133.3
93.7
$0.33
$0.32
80.0
40.4
$0.59
$0.56
57.1
17.5
$0.90
$0.82

1
57.1
42.2
$0.34
$0.31
44.4
24.0
$0.66
$0.58
36.4
12.5
$1.04
$0.87

Horizontal Distortions (HD)
2
3
36.4
26.7
28.2
21.6
$0.35
$0.38
$0.30
$0.28
30.8
23.5
17.8
14.4
$0.75
$0.89
$0.60
$0.63
26.7
21.1
10.1
8.7
$1.24
$1.59
$0.94
$1.02

4
21.1
17.8
$0.42
$0.27
19.0
12.4
$1.16
$0.66
17.4
7.8
$2.33
$1.13

7
12.9
12.3
N/A
$0.15
12.1
9.2
N/A
$0.93
11.4
N/A 6.4
N/A
$2.05

ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%
ActStRevMaxTR (%)
NatRevMaxTR (%)
MargTaxCann ($) at CA tax rate of 13.3%
MargTaxCann ($) at NJ tax rate of 8.97%

Once again, for our first takeaway, we can see that marginal tax
cannibalization (MTC) is positive for every cell—this time including when
the vertical distortions measurement is below 1 and when the horizontal
distortions measurement is 7. Thus, for equivalent reasons to those in our
earlier analyses of corporate income and capital gains tax rates,109 we again
infer that vertical externalities almost certainly exceed horizontal
externalities for the top state-level ordinary income tax rates. However, we
reemphasize here the caveat that this is only necessarily so with respect to
taxpayers in the top federal rate bracket. Our model does not allow us to
assess with any confidence whether or not vertical externalities also exceed
horizontal externalities with respect to taxpayers in the lower federal rate
brackets. Our conclusion here may thus only apply to states with relatively
progressive rate structures.110
We next ask: is this positive tax cannibalization sufficiently large for
any state-level ordinary income tax rates to exceed their national revenuemaximizing levels? In contrast to the prior two Sections, the answer here is:
probably not. Based on our midpoint estimate for vertical distortions of
1.25, horizontal distortions would need to be close to 4 for even
California’s top ordinary income tax rate (the highest) to exceed its national
revenue-maximizing level. Although a horizontal distortions measurement
of 4 might arguably be plausible, we view that as a high-point estimate
based on the (limited and only suggestively relevant) existing empirical
literature.111
Accordingly, we infer that tax cannibalization is almost certainly
positive for the top state-level ordinary income tax rates, at least with
respect to taxpayers in the top federal rate brackets. Yet we also—but more
tentatively—infer that this positive tax cannibalization is probably not so
108
109
110
111

As in Table 1, we put “N/A” (for “Not Applicable”) in boxes where MTC is infinite.
See supra notes 73–74, 95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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large that any state’s current ordinary income tax rates exceed their national
revenue-maximizing levels.
Nevertheless, the tax cannibalization that results from the top statelevel ordinary income tax rates is most likely rather significant, at least in
those states with relatively progressive rate structures. For instance, based
on a vertical distortions measurement of 1.25, and on a horizontal
distortions measurement of somewhere between 0 and 3, New Jersey’s top
ordinary income tax rate would, on net, cannibalize between $0.56 and
$0.63 of revenue from other governments per marginal $1.00 of revenue
raised by New Jersey. Although this is not quite as blatant a result as what
we found from our analyses of corporate income and capital gains tax rates,
this still implies that New Jersey lawmakers likely perceive the state-level
welfare costs of raising revenue through New Jersey’s top ordinary income
tax rate as being less than half of the full national welfare costs.
F.

Summary and Synthesis

The primary message of this Part is that tax cannibalization is
currently very large.112 This is especially, flagrantly so for the top statelevel tax rates on corporate income and capital gains. But this is also so for
the top state-level ordinary income tax rates, in at least some states, albeit
to a much lesser extent. Before proceeding, it is worth saying a bit more—
at a more conceptual level—about why the costs from tax cannibalization
are so enormous within the context of contemporary federal tax law.
One reason is that the federal government currently levies relatively
high tax rates on somewhat narrow bases. Indeed, the United States stands
alone among major developed countries in not raising a large portion of its
revenues through a value-added tax (VAT), and then compensates for this
by levying some of the world’s highest tax rates on corporate income,
capital gains, and ordinary income.113 The federal government then defines
112

Of course, this conclusion is based on extrapolations from the existing empirical literature. Yet,
so as to not continually repeat this caveat, throughout the rest of this Article we will treat these
extrapolations as roughly accurate—and indeed we believe that they probably are roughly accurate.
113
See William G. Gale & Benjamin H. Harris, A VAT for the United States: Part of the Solution,
in THE VAT READER: WHAT A FEDERAL CONSUMPTION TAX WOULD MEAN FOR AMERICA 64, 65
(2011),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/VATReader.pdf/$file/VATReader.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52DV-ZHFB] (“[T]he VAT is in place in about 150 countries worldwide and in every
OECD country other than the United States.”); Kyle Pomerleau, 2015 International Tax
Competitiveness Index, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/2015international-tax-competitiveness-index [https://perma.cc/W7BE-C6W2] (explaining that the United
States has “the highest corporate income tax rate in the OECD” and “a relatively high, progressive
individual income tax”); Kyle Pomerleau, U.S. Taxpayers Face the 6th Highest Top Marginal Capital
Gains Tax Rate in the OECD, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/us-taxpayersface-6th-highest-top-marginal-capital-gains-tax-rate-oecd [https://perma.cc/Q3NE-ZHAL].
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these tax bases in ways that permit large-scale tax avoidance and tax
gaming, especially for the corporate income and capital gains tax bases.114
There is controversy as to how successful the federal government might be
in fixing these loopholes and structural flaws if greater effort were applied
toward tax reform. Regardless, as things stand, the empirical literature
implies that there is only limited space between the federal government’s
top tax rates on corporate income and capital gains, and the overall
revenue-maximizing levels for these tax rates. There is thus only
constricted room for state-level tax rates on these bases without unduly
harming national welfare. To a lesser degree, this is also so for the top tax
rates on ordinary income.
But this is only part of the story. The other part harks back to the
classical theoretical result of the fiscal federalism literature.115 So long as
horizontal distortions are positive, state-level tax rates on corporate income,
capital gains, and ordinary income are simply less efficient than are their
federal analogs.116 This potentially makes tax cannibalization a much worse
problem.
As we have shown, despite the relative inefficiency of state-level tax
rates on corporate income, capital gains, and ordinary income, state
governments face incentives to tax these bases at what may be excessively
high top rates. Because of tax cannibalization, the costs from states doing
so are largely borne by the federal government.117 This Article’s principal
argument is that policymakers should understand and take account of these
(potentially huge) costs.

114

See supra notes 59–64, 81–84, 101–04 and accompanying text; see also Gamage, supra note 29,
at 365–68, 404–10 (discussing the prevalence of tax gaming).
115
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
116
If horizontal distortions are substantially positive, the top state-level tax rates on ordinary
income are far less efficient than the top federal-level tax rates. For example, consider that (in Table 3),
for our midpoint vertical distortions measurement of 1.25, the values for the acting state’s revenuemaximizing tax rates start at 80% when horizontal distortions are 0, then drop to 44.4% when horizontal
distortions are 1, and to 23.5% when horizontal distortions are 3. The values for the national revenuemaximizing tax rates similarly drop from 40.4%, to 24%, to 14.4%. Accordingly, if horizontal
distortions are substantially positive, the top state-level tax rates on ordinary income are far less
efficient than the top federal-level tax rates.
117
Of course, tax cannibalization can also work in a downward direction, such that some of the
costs from the federal government’s relatively high tax rates are borne by state governments. But
because the federal government’s tax rates are currently much higher than are state-level tax rates, and
because only state-level tax rates induce horizontal distortions, the costs from upward tax
cannibalization (that we focus on) are currently dramatically larger than the costs from downward tax
cannibalization (which we do not focus on).
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III. HOW TAX CANNIBALIZATION BIASES STATE GOVERNMENTS’
TAX BASE CHOICES
We have now explained that the vertical externalities currently
induced by the top state-level corporate income and capital gains tax rates
almost certainly overpower the horizontal externalities. In other words, tax
cannibalization for these tax rates is almost certainly positive—and
strongly so.
Even on its own, this suggests that state governments might be biased
toward relying too much on these forms of taxation. Yet fully
demonstrating this bias requires further analysis when tax cannibalization is
positive but when state tax rates are set below their national revenuemaximizing levels.
State governments must raise revenue somehow. Under our working
assumption of strict budget and distribution constraints, if a state
government gives up revenue (or distribution) by reducing its reliance on
certain tax rates, the state government must then make up for the lost
revenue (or distribution) by increasing the use of some other forms of
taxation.118 Therefore, to fully assess whether tax cannibalization biases
state governments to overtax the corporate income, capital gains, or
ordinary income tax bases, we must evaluate the relative tax
cannibalization for these forms of taxation as compared to alternatives.
Accordingly, we demonstrate in this Part that contemporary federal
tax law biases state governments to overtax the corporate income and
capital gains tax bases, and more tentatively also the ordinary income tax
base, at least with respect to the versions of these tax bases that are defined
by the federal government’s tax-base-definition rules. We make these
demonstrations primarily by comparison to the alternative of state sales
taxes.
There are two steps to our argument in this Part. The key elements of
the first step are already well established in the existing tax legal literature.
Prior scholarship has clarified how contemporary federal tax law pushes
state governments toward greater use of corporate and personal income
taxes and toward lesser use of sales and other indirect taxes.119 Prior
scholarship has also clarified how contemporary federal tax law pushes
state governments toward mostly piggybacking on the federal
government’s tax-base-definition rules when implementing state-level
118

See infra Section IV.F.
Following common practice in the economics literature, we refer to taxes like retail sales taxes
and gross receipts taxes as “indirect taxes,” based on the notions that (in contrast to corporate income
taxes) the burden of these taxes is intended to fall largely on individual consumption purchases and (in
contrast to personal income taxes) the nominal taxpayers for these taxes are businesses.
119
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corporate and personal income taxes. However, prior scholarship has not
convincingly demonstrated why this is a problem that the federal
government should be concerned with.
The second step of our argument, which presents our unique
contribution to the literature on state tax base choices, demonstrates why
the federal government should be concerned. Because of tax
cannibalization, the federal government loses out whenever state
governments overtax the federally defined corporate or personal income tax
bases. To elaborate on this, we explain how certain aspects of
contemporary federal tax law bias state governments to overtax the
federally defined corporate income and capital gains tax bases and more
tentatively also the ordinary income tax base (all as a result of tax
cannibalization). These biases are then exacerbated by the ways in which
other aspects of contemporary federal tax law push state governments to
further overtax these same bases (as shown by prior tax legal scholarship).
Put together, the united force of these two steps warps state governments’
tax base choices in directions that are harmful to national welfare.
A.

How Federal Tax Law Pushes State Governments

Because prior tax legal scholarship has already clarified the key
elements of the first step of our argument, in this Part we limit ourselves to
briefly highlighting this prior scholarship and its implications. We begin
with how contemporary federal tax law pushes state governments toward
greater use of corporate and personal income taxes and toward lesser use of
sales and other indirect taxes.
Professor Kirk Stark has provided the most comprehensive account of
this federal–state relationship:
[T]he basic picture is that under current law, the federal government generally
favors the adoption of state individual and corporate income taxes (by virtue
of both the administrative benefits associated with base conformity and the
price effects associated with federal income tax deductibility) . . . .
Additionally, federal law currently disfavors the adoption of general sales
taxes (by virtue of the lack of any base conformity benefits and the usual lack
of any price effects from deductibility).120

One way in which contemporary federal tax law pushes state
governments’ tax base choices is by offering states the opportunity to
piggyback on the administrative and enforcement infrastructure for the
120

Stark, supra note 8, at 431. Note that Congress in 2015 made the deduction for state sales taxes
permanent. Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 106, 129 Stat.
3040, 3046. Nevertheless, for the reasons Stark explains, the structure of the deduction still disfavors
sales taxes.
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federal-level corporate and personal income taxes. As Stark elaborates,
“[t]he very existence of the Code, Treasury Regulations, IRS administrative
guidance, and federal judicial case law creates an almost irresistible
incentive for the states to adopt individual and corporate income taxes.”121
The federal government does not currently offer any equivalent support for
state-level sales or other broad-based indirect taxes.
Indeed, the federal government currently places a number of
impediments in the way of states effectively administering their own sales
and other indirect taxes.122 Among the most important of these impediments
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,123 followed
by Congress’s failure to pass the subsequent legislation invited by that
decision.124 Until Congress passes such authorizing legislation, the Quill
decision seriously limits the reach of state sales and use taxes.125 Notably,
state corporate income taxes are not similarly limited,126 and this is so even
for state corporate income taxes that use single-sales-factor apportionment,
which makes these taxes otherwise effectively similar to sales and other
indirect taxes from state governments’ perspectives (but not from the
federal government’s perspective).127 Accordingly, as Stark concludes, “as
long as the Quill rule stands, state retail sales taxes will remain nothing
more than a weak imitation of a consumption tax.”128 This inevitably
pushes state governments toward lesser use of sales taxes and toward
greater use of corporate and personal income taxes.

121

Stark, supra note 8, at 423.
Id. at 427–32.
123
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
124
For further discussion of the sort of legislation Congress might pass, see Andrew J. Haile, David
Gamage & Darien Shankse, A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation, 67 ST. TAX NOTES
747 (2013); David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of ECommerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 531–32 (2012).
125
Specifically, the Quill decision largely shields e-commerce transactions from sales taxation. See
Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 124, at 484. This limitation has seriously
hindered states from levying effective sales taxes, both by directly restricting the reach of these taxes
and because higher sales tax rates result in greater leakage through state taxpayers shifting purchases to
exempt e-commerce retailers.
126
Stark, supra note 8, at 428–29.
127
The income earned by a multistate corporation is apportioned by formula across the various
states in which the corporation has a nexus. States use different apportionment formulas, with the
current trend being to use formulas based on the number of sales a corporation has in a state (i.e., the
“sales factor”). For further discussion of these issues, see Charles E. McLure, Jr., The State Corporate
Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 327, 341–42 (Henry J.
Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); Darien Shanske, A New Theory of the State Corporate Income
Tax: The State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement, 66 TAX L. REV. 305, 311–317
(2013).
128
Stark, supra note 8, at 430.
122
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Another way in which contemporary federal tax law pushes state
governments’ tax base choices is through the state and local tax (SALT)
deduction. The mechanics of this deduction are somewhat complicated
under current law, especially as it interacts with the alternative minimum
tax.129 Nevertheless, as Stark concludes, “the SALT deduction establishes
clear price effects favoring the adoption of . . . income taxes over sales
taxes.”130 He continues, “[o]n balance, therefore, the federal subsidy
disfavors greater state reliance on sales taxes . . . .”131
Stark argues against the aforementioned ways contemporary federal
tax law pushes state governments’ tax base choices, on account of how this
worsens state-level fiscal volatility and resulting state budget crises.132 We
agree.133 State-level taxes on corporate income and on capital gains are the
primary sources of the fiscal-volatility-induced boom-and-bust cycle that
has caused damaging state budget crises.134 Nevertheless, we doubt that the
federal government has enough of a direct stake in these problems for this
to be sufficient motivation on its own to reform how it pushes state
governments toward greater use of corporate and personal income taxes.135
Certainly, the fiscal volatility problem is one factor deterring state
governments from even greater reliance on corporate and personal income
taxes.136 But state-level fiscal volatility and the resulting state budget crises
affect the federal government only indirectly and to a much lesser extent
129

See id. at 425–27.
Id. at 425–26.
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Id. at 427.
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Id. at 431–32.
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For some of our writings on the fiscal volatility problem, see, for example, David Gamage,
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749 (2010);
Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize State and Local
Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413 (2012).
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See Stark, supra note 8, at 422–23.
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An article by Brian Galle and Kirk Stark, and another by John Brooks, argue for other reforms
that the federal government might implement to address state-level fiscal volatility. Brooks, supra note
7, at 94 (“[I]ncorporation of the insurance function of taxation illuminates the degree to which risks can
and should be shared and spread throughout a federal system. . . . [T]his Article . . . views the combined
federal/state tax-and-transfer system as a coherent whole, and asks how such a system can operate more
effectively.”); Brian Galle and Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State
Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 602 (2012) (“We propose . . . a set of federal policies to encourage
states to establish robust rainy day funds (RDFs) subject to restrictions on withdrawal except in the case
of genuine fiscal emergency.”). We worry that the federal government lacks enough of a direct stake in
the fiscal volatility problem to motivate even these reforms. But for the purposes of this Article, the key
point is that even if federal tax lawmakers decide to act to address the state fiscal volatility problem,
there are more promising approaches for this than reforming how federal tax law pushes state
governments’ tax base choices.
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For instance, see Stark’s discussion of how the fiscal volatility problem has played a central role
in California’s recent tax reform debates. Stark, supra note 8, at 432–36.
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than these problems affect state governments. Consequently, by
demonstrating that tax cannibalization causes the federal government to
lose revenue by pushing state governments toward greater use of corporate
and personal income taxes, we offer a more persuasive argument for
motivating the federal government to reform these aspects of contemporary
federal tax law.
Proceeding to how contemporary federal tax law pushes state
governments to mostly piggyback on the federal government’s tax-basedefinition rules when implementing state-level corporate and personal
income taxes, the most comprehensive account of this is by Professor Ruth
Mason. Mason concludes that although states have the formal option to
deviate from the federal government’s tax-base-definition rules, and states
do in fact deviate from these rules in certain ways, there are “political,
procedural, and administrative obstacles” that result in the states mostly
piggybacking on the federal government’s tax-base-definition rules when
implementing corporate and personal income taxes.137
Mason argues that there are both costs and benefits to this practice of
piggybacking. She stresses the costs of this piggybacking to “federalism
values,” such as an inability to tailor state tax policy to local voters’ distinct
preferences and to differing local conditions, diminishing political
accountability, and reducing policy experimentation.138 She further explains
that some federal tax-base-definition rules are easier for states to opt out
from than others, and that there is no necessary connection between the
ease of states opting out and the balance of costs versus benefits from states
doing so.139
In particular, states can (and regularly do) deviate from federal taxbase-definition rules in order to compete with other states by offering
special tax benefits to lure mobile business activities.140 In a separate
article, we argue that tax cannibalization currently biases state governments
toward greater use of these sorts of deviations at the expense of national
welfare.141 However, in this Article, we focus instead on how tax
137

Mason, supra note 1, at 1272.
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David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and State Government Tax Incentive
Programs, 82 ST. TAX NOTES 197 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id
=2869605 [https://perma.cc/S4N4-FQTT]. The essence of our argument in this piece starts by
explaining that state governments regularly decide between either offering special tax preferences to
lure mobile economic activity or levying taxes with broader bases and lower rates. State governments
frequently choose the former strategy and so give away massive dollar amounts of special tax
preferences. What has not previously been understood is that—because of tax cannibalization—the
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cannibalization biases state governments against opting out in certain ways
that might otherwise enhance national welfare.142
B.

How Federal Tax Law Biases State Governments

The second step of our argument in this Part is based on tax
cannibalization. More specifically, we explain that tax cannibalization is
relatively much greater for the top state-level tax rates on corporate income
and on capital gains, as compared to state sales tax rates and also as
compared to certain other potential alternatives. We similarly explain that
this is also probably so for top state-level ordinary income tax rates,
although we conclude this more tentatively.
Yet some further clarification is needed before we begin this analysis.
The states’ top tax rates on capital gains and on ordinary income are
generally more progressive than are the states’ sales tax rates. We think the
same is probably true for the states’ corporate income tax rates, although
there is some dispute about this in the literature.143 Nevertheless, we rely on
the working assumption of strict revenue and distribution constraints.
But what does it mean to compare raising revenue from more
progressive forms of taxation (e.g., personal income tax rates) to raising
revenue from more regressive forms of taxation (e.g., sales tax rates) under
strict revenue and distribution constraints? The answer is relatively easy to
explain for revenue neutrality. All this requires is for the state to adjust its
tax rates so as to ensure that the states’ revenue loss from reducing certain
tax rates is recouped by raising other tax rates.
Similarly, ensuring distributional neutrality potentially requires the
state to make adjustments to recoup lost distribution. For example,
California State Senator Bob Hertzberg has proposed a reduction to
California’s personal income tax rates, accompanied both by revenueraising reforms to California’s sales tax and by offering tax credits to lowand middle-income taxpayers.144 Notably, although Senator Hertzberg’s
federal government bears much of the cost when states enact special tax preferences rather than levying
taxes with broader bases and lower rates. In this way, contemporary federal tax law biases state
governments toward enacting special tax preferences even when doing so is strongly against national
welfare. We then explain how federal-level reforms could alleviate this aspect of the tax cannibalization
problem.
142
See infra Section III.B.6.
143
See Suárez Serrato & Zidar, supra note 68, at 1 (discussing corporate tax incidence and the
disagreements about what this means for the progressivity of corporate tax rates).
144
See S.B. 8, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); see also John Diaz, State Sen. Bob Hertzberg
Takes on Toughest Issue: Tax Reform, SFGATE (Jan. 16, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/
opinion/diaz/article/State-Sen-Bob-Hertzberg-takes-on-toughest-issue-6021174.php [https://perma.cc/
RMF3-QHT5] (“The last thing Hertzberg would want to do . . . would be to make the tax structure more
regressive. So his [proposals include] . . . providing tax credits for the poor . . . .”).
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proposals would reduce California’s (more progressive) personal income
tax rates while increasing California’s (more regressive) taxation of its
sales tax base,145 the overall effect of the proposed reform package would
be to increase both California’s revenues and distribution. This is because
the lost distribution from swapping to a more regressive form of taxation
would be more than recouped by the new tax credits.
Our purpose in this discussion is not to advocate for any specific
approach for recouping lost distribution. Our goal is only to explain that
opting for a more regressive form of taxation can be done in a
distributionally neutral fashion by accompanying that switch with new tax
credits—or, alternatively, with adjustments to other tax rates, or with other
approaches for recouping the lost distribution.
We thus evaluate the national welfare implications of the states’ tax
base choices by abstracting from (controversial) questions about the proper
size of governments with respect to either revenue or distribution.146 We
later explain how the federal government can reform how it influences
state-level tax base choices while maintaining the same incentives in regard
to overall revenue and distribution. For now, though, we just assume strict
revenue and distribution constraints to facilitate our analysis. Accordingly,
we compare state-level corporate income, capital gains, and ordinary
income tax rates to hypothetical alternatives that have been modified to be
equally as progressive (such as by accompanying state sales tax rate hikes
with expanded tax credits for low- and middle-income taxpayers).
1.

At First Glance: The Tax Cannibalization Problem Is Mostly
About the Federal Government’s Tax Rates.—We begin our
analysis by assessing the relative vertical externalities generated by
different forms of state-level taxation. Vertical externalities come from a
state government and the federal government taxing overlapping bases. For
every dollar by which vertical distortions shrink these overlapping tax
bases, the federal government loses revenue equal to the effective marginal
tax rates that the federal government assesses on these tax bases.
Consequently, the federal government’s tax rates determine what portions
of vertical distortions constitute vertical externalities.
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See Cal. S.B. 8.
Our analytic approach in this Part of controlling for revenue and distribution follows common
practice among tax policy experts when evaluating bipartisan proposals for tax reform. See David
Gamage, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Testimony Before the California State
Assembly, Committee on Revenue and Taxation, Informational Hearing on Academic Perspectives on
the Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the 21st Century Economy (Oct. 2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608504 [https://perma.cc/6JBX-STMP].
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The federal government currently levies much higher tax rates on
corporate income, ordinary income, and capital gains, when compared to
the federal government’s minimal use of indirect taxes. Specifically, the
federal government currently levies a corporate income tax that assesses a
35% statutory tax rate on most taxable corporate income.147 The federal
government also currently levies a personal income tax that assesses a
progressive schedule of tax rates, with a maximum statutory rate of 39.6%
on ordinary income and of 20% on capital gains (or of 23.8%, when
combined with the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax).148 In contrast, the
federal government currently levies only minimal excise taxes and does not
currently levy a national sales tax or any other similar broad-based indirect
tax.149
At first glance, it is thus readily apparent how the federal
government’s current tax rates result in much larger vertical externalities
for state-level corporate income tax rates, capital gains tax rates, and
ordinary income tax rates, as opposed to the rates of state-level sales taxes.
For instance, if vertical distortions shrink the federally defined corporate
income tax base by $1.00, this might cost the federal government
something like $0.35 in revenue (the federal statutory corporate income tax
rate). In contrast, if vertical distortions shrink sales and indirect tax bases
by $1.00, this might cost the federal government close to zero revenue
(because the federal government levies only minimal indirect taxes).
Moreover, this conclusion does not meaningfully change even after
adjusting the states’ sales tax rates to ensure distributional neutrality. For
instance, making a sales tax rate marginally as progressive as a personal
income tax rate probably requires hiking the sales tax rate somewhat to
fund, for example, expanded tax credits for low- and middle-income
taxpayers. Nevertheless, because the federal government currently levies
only minimal indirect taxes, any additional shrinkage to the sales tax base
induced by raising sales tax rates to fund these tax credits will produce only
minimal incremental vertical externalities.
At first glance, this may all seem rather straightforward. That the
federal government levies dramatically higher tax rates on corporate
income, capital gains, and ordinary income, would seem to support a prima
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See supra note 69.
See supra notes 73, 98.
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James R. Hines Jr., Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (2007)
(“There is . . . no federal sales tax, and only a rather modest assortment of federal excise taxes. . . . The
federal tax on gasoline and related products accounts for . . . 45 percent of total excise tax collections,
with the remainder consisting principally of federal taxes on tobacco (11 percent of total excise taxes),
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facie case that vertical externalities are much higher for these tax bases, at
least as compared to sales tax rates. Yet a second glance reveals a more
complicated story.
Nevertheless, a third glance then clarifies that the straightforward
takeaways from the first glance are mostly correct, at least for state-level
taxes on corporate income and capital gains. In other words, despite the
complications that we will now proceed to discuss, it ultimately remains
the case that the federal government’s relatively high tax rates on corporate
income and on capital gains result in differentially much larger vertical
externalities for these tax bases. This is also probably so for state-level
taxes on ordinary income, but with greater uncertainty.
2.

At a Second and Third Glance: It Is (Somewhat) More
Complicated.—To understand why a second glance reveals a
more complicated story, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine if the
only way in which taxpayers could respond to any form of taxation was by
reducing their work effort. Further imagine that all forms of state-level
taxation similarly induce taxpayers to reduce their work effort—because,
for example, hiking the rate of a sales tax would reduce taxpayers’
incentives to work for the purpose of funding purchases that would be
subject to that sales tax. Under these assumptions, all forms of state-level
taxation might similarly affect all federal tax bases (at least after
controlling for revenue and distribution). Vertical externalities would then
potentially be similar for all forms of state-level taxation, and there might
thus be no biases to state-level tax base choices, even despite the dramatic
differences in federal tax rates.
Much of the prior theoretical literature analyzing tax base choices
relies on (extreme) assumptions similar to those in the above
hypothetical.150 However, in recent scholarship, one of us critiqued that
prior theoretical literature’s reliance on these sorts of assumptions.151 The
essence of this critique is that many important distortionary responses are
unique to only certain forms of taxation (defined as “single-instrument”
distortions).152 Accordingly, to appreciate how a third glance resolves much
of the complication that arose from the second glance, we need only
understand that the majority of the measured vertical distortionary
responsiveness for corporate income and capital gains tax rates consists of
single instrument distortions for these forms of taxation, at least relative to
sales taxes.
150
151
152
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3.

Comparing the States’ Corporate Income Tax Rates to Sales Tax
Rates.—Consider first the measured distortionary responsiveness
to corporate income tax rates, as compared to sales tax rates. Certainly, not
all of this measured distortionary responsiveness is single-instrument.
Correspondingly, perhaps about a third of the measured responsiveness to
corporate income tax rates comes from taxpayers shifting real investment
activities abroad.153 This form of responsiveness might well be induced by
the overall tax burden on business investments—potentially including both
the burden of corporate income tax rates and the burden of sales tax rates.
A state government swapping from the use of corporate income tax rates to
the (distributional and revenue-neutral) use of sales tax rates might thus not
substantially reduce this form of distortionary responsiveness.
By contrast, the remaining two-thirds or so of the measured
distortionary responsiveness to corporate income tax rates comes from: (a)
profit shifting, (b) shifting from the use of corporate organizational forms
to partnership organizational forms, and (c) shifting from equity financing
to debt financing.154 These forms of responsiveness are directly induced
only by corporate income tax rates, not by sales tax rates (at least not to any
substantial degree).
For instance, perhaps the most prevalent form of profit shifting
involves a foreign subsidiary corporation charging its U.S.-based parent
corporation inflated prices for the use of intellectual property controlled by
the foreign subsidiary.155 By doing so, the corporate group reduces the
profits reported to the domestic federal and state governments for the
purpose of assessing corporate income tax liabilities, by instead reporting
these profits to the foreign (lower tax) jurisdiction of the subsidiary. This
form of distortionary responsiveness is thus only directly induced by
corporate income tax rates, not by sales tax rates, because only reported
profits need be shifted to the foreign jurisdiction. More generally, shifting
reported profits to subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions—as opposed to
shifting real investment activities—does not directly affect sales tax
liabilities, as sales tax liabilities do not depend on profitability.
153

See de Mooij & Ederveen, supra note 12, at 695 (reporting a combined semi-elasticity for
shifting real investment abroad of 1.05, as compared to a combined semi-elasticity for profit shifting,
substituting debt for equity, and shifting organizational form of 2.05).
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Id.
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See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 2, 2 (2015) (“Multinational corporations use intellectual property . . . to avoid taxes on a massive
scale . . . .”). Blair-Stanek illustrates this point with an example regarding an Irish subsidiary of Google,
which holds technology patents and sells devices to Google distributors: “[a]s consequence, the
substantial profits from the IP remain in Ireland, typically not subject to Irish tax, and also not subject to
U.S. tax so long as the cash is not returned to the U.S.” Id. at 11.
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Similar logic holds when taxpayers shift to the use of partnership
forms or to the use of debt financing to reduce their domestic federal- and
state-level corporate income tax liabilities. These distortionary responses
again directly reduce the taxpayers’ corporate income tax liabilities, but do
not directly affect the taxpayers’ sales tax liabilities. After all, conducting
business in a partnership form looks the same from the perspective of a
sales tax as does conducting business in a corporate form. Likewise, the
sales and purchasing activities of a corporation appear the same from the
perspective of a sales tax regardless of the extent to which the corporation
is financed with debt or with equity.
Therefore, we might estimate that a state government swapping from
the use of a corporate income tax to the use of a sales tax might thereby
reduce the overall vertical distortions previously induced by the corporate
income tax rate by perhaps about two-thirds as much as would instead
lowering the corporate income tax rate without replacing the lost revenue
and distribution. We earlier said that 2.5 is a plausible midpoint estimate
for the semi-elasticity of the vertical distortions induced by corporate
income tax rates. We might thus take 1.67 (two-thirds of 2.5) as a plausible
estimate for the semi-elasticity of the differentially greater extent to which
corporate income tax rates shrink the corporate income tax base through
vertical distortions, as compared to sales tax rates.
Because we have already discussed the federal government’s tax rates
on corporate income (35%) and on sales (close to 0%), and also the
relevant state-level tax rates, we now have almost all of the inputs we need
to apply our model. All we are missing is a measurement for horizontal
distortions. We thus next assess whether state-level corporate income tax
rates might induce differentially greater or smaller horizontal distortions, as
compared to state-level sales tax rates, and what the semi-elasticity of this
difference might be.
Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature offers little help in
answering this question. As we discussed previously, there is suggestive
evidence that state-level corporate income tax rates induce substantial
horizontal distortions.156 But there is also suggestive evidence that statelevel sales tax rates induce substantial horizontal distortions.157 We do not
know of any straightforward way to calculate the differential horizontal
distortions induced by these two forms of taxation based on the existing
empirical literature.
156

See supra Section II.C.
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Fortunately, this does not matter all that much for our purposes. We
earlier explained why it is improbable that the horizontal externalities
induced by state corporate income tax rates could be so large as to
overpower the vertical externalities (and that the same logic holds for the
top state-level capital gains and ordinary income tax rates).158 Analogously,
because the difference between the federal government’s corporate income
tax rate and its indirect tax rates (35% v. close to 0%) is so large by
comparison to either state-level corporate income tax rates or state-level
sales tax rates, it is improbable that differential horizontal externalities
could exceed differential vertical externalities.
Consistent with this, based on the differential vertical distortions
estimate of 1.67, and any plausible differential horizontal distortions
estimate (say, between -4 and 4), our model approximates that—for most
states159—swapping from raising a marginal $1.00 from the state’s sales tax
rate to raising that marginal $1.00 instead from the state’s corporate income
tax rate would cannibalize somewhere between $0.50 and $0.95 of net
revenue from other governments.160
Put more simply, horizontal distortions do somewhat matter. But they
do not matter so much within the probable range for the relevant empirical
parameters to alter the key takeaway. That key takeaway is that tax
cannibalization biases state governments to overtax the federally defined
corporate income tax base relative to the sales tax base. More specifically,
for every marginal $1.00 a typical state raises from its top corporate income
tax rate rather than from its sales tax rate, our model approximates that
other governments might lose perhaps somewhere between $0.50 and $0.95
of net revenue from tax cannibalization.
4.

Comparing the States’ Capital Gains Tax Rates to Sales Tax
Rates.—The analysis is similar for comparing capital gains tax
rates to sales tax rates. As we discussed earlier, the convincing evidence of
measured vertical distortionary responsiveness to capital gains tax rates
comes from selective realization responses.161
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See supra Part II.
The primary exceptions are the six states that do not currently levy corporate income taxes. The
other exception is Iowa, which currently levies the highest state corporate income tax rate at 12%. If
differential vertical distortions are 3 (or 4), then Iowa’s opting to raise a marginal $1.00 of revenue from
its corporate income tax rate rather than from its sales tax rate would cannibalize $1.03 (or $1.28) of
revenue from other governments.
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The assumptions behind these approximations are the same as in Section II.B. The
approximations are derived from Expression (C) in the Technical Appendix.
161
See supra Section II.D.
159

347

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Selective realization responses are primarily single-instrument
distortions162 for capital gains tax rates, at least as compared to sales tax
rates. For instance, the higher the capital gains tax rate, the more incentive
taxpayers have to forgo shifting their appreciated investments to alternative
investments (such as by selling stock to purchase different stock), as
shifting appreciated investments triggers the capital gains tax.163 By
contrast, shifting appreciated investments does not trigger sales tax, as sales
tax bases generally do not include financial assets. Similarly, the higher the
capital gains tax rate, the more incentive taxpayers have to forgo selling
their appreciated investments and to instead borrow against those
investments to fund consumption, so as to avoid triggering the capital gains
tax.164 By contrast, funding consumption through borrowing triggers sales
tax, the same as does funding consumption by selling appreciated
investments, because consumption purchases are included in sales tax bases
regardless of whether they are financed with borrowing or cash. More
generally, so long as future consumption is taxed at the same sales tax rates
as is present consumption, sales tax rates are neutral as to the timing of
when capital gains are realized.165
We thus take our prior midpoint estimate for the vertical distortions
associated with persistent selective realization responses (of 3.15) as also
being a plausible estimate for the semi-elasticity of the differentially
greater extent to which capital gains tax rates shrink the capital gains tax
base through vertical distortions, as compared to sales tax rates. With that,
we have all of the inputs that we need to apply our model, again using a
wide range of measurements for differential horizontal distortions.
Consider our model’s approximation for the tax cannibalization
created by New Jersey’s raising a marginal $1.00 of revenue from its top
capital gains tax rate (8.97%) rather than from its sales tax rate. Inputting a
range for differential horizontal distortion measurements of between -4 and
4, and our midpoint vertical distortions measurement of 3.15, our model
approximates that New Jersey is cannibalizing somewhere between $0.82
and $1.71 of revenue from other governments.166
These approximations would be larger in California and in other states
with higher top capital gains tax rates. At California’s top rate (13.3%),
162

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Uneasy Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the Second
Best?, 48 TAX NOTES 195, 200–01 (1990).
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Gamage, supra note 29, at 435.
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See David A. Weisbach, The Case for a Consumption Tax, 110 TAX NOTES 1357, 1357 (2006)
(explaining that consumption taxes do not distort “savings decisions”).
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these approximations would range from $0.80 to $12.51. Conversely, these
approximations would be smaller in North Dakota and in other states with
lower top capital gains tax rates. At North Dakota’s top rate (1.932%),
these approximations would range from $0.71 to $0.87.
The key takeaway is that tax cannibalization biases state governments
to overtax the federally defined capital gains tax base relative to the sales
tax base. More specifically, for every marginal $1.00 a typical state raises
from its top capital gains tax rate rather than from its sales tax rate, our
model approximates that other governments might lose perhaps somewhere
between $0.71 and well over $1.00 of net revenue from tax
cannibalization.167
5.

Comparing the States’ Ordinary Income Tax Rates to Sales Tax
Rates.—The analysis is more uncertain for state ordinary income
tax rates, in part because we lack any reliable indications for how much of
the measured responsiveness to ordinary income tax rates consists of
single-instrument distortions rather than distortions that are also induced by
sales tax rates. When considering an analogous question in prior
scholarship, one of us concluded “as a very rough best-guess estimate” that
“perhaps 50%” of the measured responsiveness to income tax rates might
constitute single-instrument distortions as compared to sales tax rates.168
This guess was based primarily on anecdotal evidence and is far from
reliable, but we do continue to think that at least a good portion of the
responsiveness to income tax rates probably constitutes single-instrument
distortions relative to sales taxes. Indeed, we lack any reason to think that
below 50% would be a better guess than above 50%.
We earlier took 1.25 as our midpoint estimate for the vertical
distortions induced by the top state ordinary income tax rates with respect
to taxpayers in the top federal rate bracket.169 Taking half of this gives us a
possible estimate of 0.625 for the differentially greater vertical distortions
to the ordinary income tax base induced by raising marginal revenue from a
state’s top ordinary income tax rate rather than from the state’s sales tax
rate. Based on this estimate, and again taking a range for differential
horizontal distortion measurements of between -4 and 4, our model
167

However, note that we purposefully picked three states (New Jersey, California, and North
Dakota) wherein the top capital gains rate brackets are similar to the federal government’s (but with
different rates), as doing so sidesteps the complication of a state’s top rate applying to taxpayers who
fall into the lower federal-level rate brackets. With respect to other states, we repeat our earlier caveat
that our approximations only necessarily apply with respect to taxpayers in the top federal rate bracket.
See supra notes 73, 98 and accompanying text.
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Gamage, supra note 29, at 410.
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See supra Section II.E.
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approximates that New Jersey’s raising a marginal $1.00 of revenue from
its ordinary income tax rate (8.97%), rather than from its sales tax rate,
cannibalizes somewhere between $0.18 and $0.30 of revenue from other
governments.170
These approximations are somewhat more tentative than our prior
approximations. For instance, if only 20% or less of the distortionary
responsiveness to income tax rates are single instrument, and if differential
horizontal distortions are on the high side, then this positive tax
cannibalization might disappear or even become negative (implying that
differential horizontal externalities might potentially slightly overpower
differential vertical externalities). Nevertheless, for most of the probable
range for the empirical input parameters, our model approximates
significantly positive marginal tax cannibalization from a state raising
revenue from its top ordinary income tax rate rather than from its sales tax
rate, at least with respect to taxpayers in the highest federal rate bracket.
Overall, then, we tentatively infer that tax cannibalization most likely
biases state governments to overuse their top ordinary income tax rates
relative to their sales tax rates, at least to some extent.
6. What About Other Potential Alternative Tax Bases?—So far we
have only discussed the possibility of states switching from the use of
corporate or personal income tax rates to the use of sales tax rates. Limiting
the scope of our discussion is necessary, in part because determining how
much of the vertical distortionary responsiveness to a tax rate constitutes
single-instrument distortions depends on what we are comparing that tax
rate to.171
Nevertheless, there are numerous potential alternative ways in which
state governments might implement what could be thought of as variations
or hybrids on corporate or personal income taxes or on indirect taxes. To
consider one example: in addition to its more traditional corporate income
tax that mostly piggybacks on the federal government’s tax-base-definition
rules (called the “Business Profits Tax”), New Hampshire also levies
another business-entity-level tax (called the “Business Enterprise Tax”).172
This Business Enterprise Tax is levied on all business entities conducting
substantial activity in New Hampshire—including both corporations and
partnerships—on a base consisting of “the total amount of interest paid,
170

The assumptions behind these approximations are the same as in Section II.E. The
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See Gamage, supra note 29, at 396.
172
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TAXATION OF BUSINESS 1–2, https://www.devinemillimet.com/uploads/docs/summary_of_nh_taxation
__m1608974_.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BYA-QUQK].
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dividends paid or accrued, and wages paid or accrued” within New
Hampshire.173
For the purposes of assessing tax cannibalization, the key question in
considering alternative forms of taxation is the extent to which these
alternatives do or do not replicate the flaws in the federally defined
corporate and personal income tax bases that result in vertical distortions.
New Hampshire’s Business Enterprise Tax bears some resemblance to both
more traditional corporate174 and personal175 income taxes. But New
Hampshire’s Business Enterprise Tax most likely does not replicate at least
some of the flaws in the federally defined corporate and personal income
tax bases that result in vertical distortions.
For a relatively simple example as to why, consider that the Business
Enterprise Tax applies to partnerships as well as to corporations, and so—
in contrast to state corporate income taxes that piggyback on the federal
government’s base-definition rules176—the Business Enterprise Tax
presumably does not induce the distortionary response of taxpayers shifting
from corporate to partnership organizational forms. Similarly, because the
Business Enterprise Tax is not based on measuring either business profits
or corporate income, it presumably does not induce the sort of profit
shifting responses that shrink the federally defined corporate income tax
base.177
Aside from our prior discussions of sales tax rates, it is beyond the
scope of this Article to evaluate more fully whether national welfare would
be enhanced were states to move more toward levying other specific
alterative tax bases (such as New Hampshire’s Business Enterprise Tax).178
For now, we seek only to make the following, relatively simple point in
regard to this question.
Because of tax cannibalization, many of the potential welfare benefits
from a state government switching from taxing the federally defined
corporate or personal income tax bases to more creative alternatives would
advantage the federal government rather than the state government
173

Id. at 2–3.
For instance, the tax is imposed on business entities based on proxies for their economic activity
within the state.
175
For instance, the tax base consists in part of interest, dividends, and wages paid by businesses.
176
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
177
See supra Section III.B.3.
178
For discussion of the merits of the Business Enterprise Tax, see JENNIFER WEINER, NEW
ENGLAND PUB. POLICY CTR., RESEARCH REPORT 11-1, HOW DOES NEW HAMPSHIRE DO IT? AN
ANALYSIS OF SPENDING AND REVENUES IN THE ABSENCE OF A BROAD-BASED INCOME OR SALES TAX
32 (2011). The report explains that the Business Enterprise Tax has “been lauded for its simplicity,
economic neutrality, and political stability.” Id.
174
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implementing the reform. By contrast, the costs of designing and
implementing the alternative tax base would be borne by the state
government. In this sense, contemporary federal tax law biases state
governments against experimenting with alternative forms of taxation that
might otherwise have the potential to enhance national welfare.
C.

Summary and Synthesis

The federal government currently levies relatively high tax rates on
corporate income, capital gains, and ordinary income. In contrast, the
federal government does not currently levy a sales tax or other broad-based
indirect tax. As a result, top state-level corporate and personal income tax
rates currently generate large marginal tax cannibalization relative to state
sales tax rates.
The biases associated with this differentially larger tax cannibalization
are strongest and most certain with respect to the top state-level corporate
income and capital gains tax rates. We approximated that for every
marginal $1.00 a typical state raises from its top corporate income tax rate,
rather from its sales tax rate, other governments might lose perhaps
somewhere between $0.50 and $0.95 of net revenue from tax
cannibalization. We similarly approximated that for every marginal $1.00 a
typical state raises from its top capital gains tax rate, rather than from its
sales tax rate, other governments might lose perhaps somewhere between
$0.71 and well over $1.00 of net revenue from tax cannibalization.
There is thus strong reason to infer that other governments currently
suffer large net revenue costs when a typical state government opts to raise
marginal revenues from its top tax rates on the federally defined corporate
and personal income tax bases, relative to alternatives. We further
emphasize that these revenue costs represent pure economic waste
(deadweight loss).
To see why, consider that a state government should be indifferent as
to whether it raises a marginal $1.00 of revenue from, say, its corporate
income tax rate or from its sales tax rate.179 Yet the federal government
should be far from indifferent. Our approximations suggest that the state
government cannibalizes somewhere between $0.50 and $0.95 of revenue
from opting to raise a marginal $1.00 from its corporate income tax rate
179

If the state government were not indifferent, then the state government should presumably have
already swapped to greater revenue generation from its preferred tax instrument, until the state
government then became indifferent. We are assuming here that the state government acts to further
state-level revenues and welfare and does not otherwise seek to promote national revenues or welfare.
This assumption corresponds both with theory, see supra Section I.B; Stark, supra note 20, at 1392–93,
and with our experience observing and advising on state-level tax reform debates.
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rather than from its sales tax rate. Therefore, because the acting state
government should be indifferent between these choices, whereas other
governments should care to the extent of somewhere between 50% and
95% of the marginal revenue raised, that 50% to 95% tax cannibalization
represents pure economic waste.
All of that was the second step of our argument in this Part. Then, in
addition, other aspects of contemporary federal tax law push state
governments toward even greater use of the federally defined corporate and
personal income tax bases, relative to alternatives, thereby exacerbating the
magnitude of this tax cannibalization problem. This was the first step of our
argument in this Part.
Putting these two steps together thus reveals that contemporary federal
tax law pushes state governments’ tax decisionmaking in directions that are
harmful to national welfare. Or, in other words, tax cannibalization
currently imposes large and wasteful costs on the federal government, and
this outcome is at least partially the federal government’s fault.
IV. HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD ALLEVIATE
THE TAX CANNIBALIZATION PROBLEM
We have shown that the federal government is partially to blame for
the current severity of the tax cannibalization problem. This is primarily
because the federal government assesses relatively high tax rates on
somewhat narrowly defined and porous bases. Thus, when state
governments levy taxes on these same bases, the result is massive tax
cannibalization.
The federal government could therefore alleviate the tax
cannibalization problem by reforming its tax rates, its tax-base-definition
rules, or both. For instance, were the federal government to follow other
developed nations by levying a VAT, along with then using the newly
generated revenues to fund reducing the rates of the federal corporate and
personal income taxes, this would go a long way toward alleviating the tax
cannibalization problem.180
There are also numerous proposals for how the federal government
might reform the tax-base-definition rules for its corporate or personal
income taxes. To the extent that these reforms could successfully address
the flaws and loopholes that currently invite large vertical distortions for
180

Implementing this sort of reform in a distributionally neutral fashion might entail making the
remaining federal personal income tax rates more progressive. Even so, the top federal personal income
tax rates needed to achieve the current level of overall tax distribution would be far lower if those rates
were supplementing a substantial VAT. For further discussion, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three
Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006); Gamage, supra note 29, at 402–13.
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these tax bases, the reforms would thereby also serve to alleviate the tax
cannibalization problem.181 By demonstrating the large costs that the
federal government currently suffers from tax cannibalization, this Article
thus adds a further argument in favor of these sorts of reforms. Indeed, we
hope that accounting for the costs of tax cannibalization might tip the
balance enough to convince federal policymakers to adopt some reforms to
federal tax rates or tax-base-definition rules.
Yet the opponents of these reforms might object that implementing
these sorts of reforms as a response to tax cannibalization would be like the
tail wagging the dog. There is already a vast literature weighing the merits
of various approaches for federal tax reform. This Article certainly
contributes to that literature by introducing tax cannibalization as an
additional factor that should be considered. Nevertheless, we think that our
efforts in this Part are probably best oriented toward explaining how the
federal government might alleviate the tax cannibalization problem under
the assumption that federal policymakers will not be willing to reform the
federal government’s current tax rates or tax-base-definition rules.
So, if federal policymakers are unwilling to reform the federal
government’s tax rates or tax-base-definition rules, how might the federal
government then alleviate the tax cannibalization problem? The basic goal
of any solution should be to reduce the states’ top tax rates on the federally
defined corporate and personal income tax bases. The states could then be
compensated for the lost revenue through some combination of direct
subsidies and incentives for the states to recoup that revenue themselves by
taxing bases that overlap less with the federal government’s.
The remainder of this Part first briefly sketches a map of possible
approaches for reform, and then proceeds to evaluate more specific reform
possibilities. Throughout, we discuss how the federal government might
reduce the states’ top tax rates on both the corporate and personal income
tax bases. The reform possibilities we discuss could be tailored to reduce
only certain of these tax rates. For instance, it might well make sense for
the federal government to target only state capital gains tax rates and not
also ordinary income tax rates. However, for expositional reasons, we
181

For example, we think that ending the preference for stepped-up basis upon death might
substantially reduce the selective realization responses to the capital gains tax rates, as might reforming
the rules for how the income tax treats borrowing. For discussion of these ideas, see Lawrence Zelenak,
Debt-Financed Consumption and a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 64 TAX L. REV. 1 (2010);
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1993). For discussion of other
possible reforms that might go even further toward combatting selective realization responses, see Alan
J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1991); Gamage, supra
note 29, at 431–37; Mark P. Gergen, The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading Under
Realization, Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation, 49 TAX L. REV. 209 (1994).
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mostly discuss reform possibilities by reference to both the corporate and
personal income tax bases.
A.

Mapping Four Categories of Reform Options

Tax cannibalization is at essence a problem of a net negative
externality—that is, a third party (the federal government) is harmed by
decisions that state governments make for their own benefit. As such, the
tax cannibalization problem can be addressed through one (or more) of four
broad categories of policy instruments of the sort that are generally
available to mitigate negative externalities. To begin with, the federal
government can use either sticks or carrots (or a mixture of both sticks and
carrots). Then, both sticks and carrots can be implemented either through a
regulatory command-and-control approach or through an incentive-based
price approach (or through some combination of these two approaches).
An example of a regulatory stick would be for the federal government
to ban state governments from using tax bases that overlap with the federal
government’s—for instance, banning state governments from taxing
corporate income. An example of a price-based stick would be for the
federal government to penalize state governments that make use of
overlapping tax bases like the corporate income tax.
An example of a regulatory carrot would be for the federal
government to design and implement a less-overlapping tax base that
would then be made available for use by state governments—for instance,
the federal government could design and implement a national sales tax
infrastructure while leaving that tax base for the exclusive use by the states.
An example of a price-based carrot would be for the federal government to
subsidize state governments’ use of less-overlapping tax bases like sales
taxes.
TABLE 4: MAPPING THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF REFORM OPTIONS
Regulatory Command-and-Control

Price-Based Incentives

Sticks

Ban of limit use of overlapping bases

Penalize use of overlapping bases

Carrots

Support use of less-overlapping bases

Subsidize use of less-overlapping bases

To foreshadow our conclusions, we propose that the federal
government use some mixture of both sticks and carrots. To the extent that
state governments are viewed even partially as a source of the tax
cannibalization problem, sticks are more directly effective at controlling
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the problem.182 Ultimately, because the goal is to reduce the state’s top tax
rates on the federally defined corporate and personal income tax bases,
some use of sticks is probably necessary to achieve this goal. Relying only
on carrots could result in the states just increasing their use of the lessoverlapping tax bases promoted by the carrots while still continuing their
same use of the overlapping tax bases that currently results in tax
cannibalization.
Yet relying solely on sticks would also be problematic, especially to
the extent that the federal government is viewed as partially to blame for
the tax cannibalization problem. Even as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly, and reasonably, insisted that there is
something special about the state revenue function that deserves
protection.183 A sticks-only approach to combatting tax cannibalization
would thus likely run afoul of constitutional doctrines, particularly the anticommandeering doctrine, designed to prevent the federal government from
coercing state governments.184 More generally, fiscal federalism in the
United States is built on a foundation of preserving a substantial role for
state fiscal autonomy. As one eminent scholar of state tax policy explains,
“[t]he case for state autonomy over tax rates is taken as axiomatic. Leaving
aside the compelling conceptual arguments for state autonomy over rates, it
seems that any system that compromised such autonomy would be
politically unacceptable.”185
Overall, then, we argue that some use of sticks is necessary to induce
state governments to reduce their tax rates on overlapping bases. But this
use of sticks should be tied in with a reform package consisting of
substantial carrots for the sticks to be viable in light of the concerns about
preserving state governments’ fiscal autonomy.
B.

Regulatory Sticks

In the absence of any concerns about interfering with state
governments’ fiscal autonomy, perhaps the most obvious solution to the tax
cannibalization problem would be for the federal government to just ban
182

For explanation of the general superiority of sticks for controlling negative externalities, see
Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments,
64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 813–31 (2012).
183
In a separate essay, we discuss the constitutional limits on the federal government’s power to
coerce or influence state governments’ tax base choices. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The
Federal Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation, 81 ST. TAX NOTES 547 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2836649 [https://perma.cc/PM9D-8CSN].
184
See id. at 550.
185
Charles E. McLure, Jr., How to Coordinate State and Local Sales Taxes with a Federal Value
Added Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 639, 645 (2010).
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state governments from taxing the corporate and personal income tax bases.
If state governments could be banned both from directly taxing these bases
and also from levying alternative forms of taxation that overlap too much
with these bases, then this would effectively solve the tax cannibalization
problem.
Yet we are skeptical that an extreme solution of this sort would be
constitutionally permissible.186 The federal government clearly has the
power to ban state governments from taxing certain activities, especially
activities that are highly related to interstate commerce.187 But we doubt
that the Supreme Court would extend this power so far as to allow the
federal government to ban the states from using major tax bases that have
historically been important tools of state policy. Moreover, we think this is
probably for good reason. We ultimately agree that there are merits to
preserving fiscal autonomy for state governments, so that (for instance)
California’s voters can have the flexibility to opt for greater distribution
than what is chosen by voters in Texas.188
Of course, state governments could still promote distribution and other
state-level tax policy goals without the use of a corporate or personal
income tax. However, income taxes on both corporations and persons have
traditionally been the primary policy tools used for promoting distribution
and also for achieving certain regulatory goals.189 We thus do not believe
that state governments should be completely deprived of these tools, unless
perhaps the federal government were to create an adequate substitute and
provide that substitute to state governments for use as a replacement.190
Moreover, these concerns about interfering with state governments’
fiscal autonomy are especially troubling to the extent that we view the
federal government as being partially to blame for the tax cannibalization
problem. Put another way: why should state governments be forced to
retreat from using overlapping tax bases rather than having the federal
government retreat? Overall, we are thus skeptical that banning
overlapping tax bases would be either constitutionally permissible or
desirable.
Rather than outright prohibiting state governments from levying
corporate or personal income taxes, it might be less constitutionally
186

See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 183, at 551.
Id. at 551–52.
188
For further discussion, see Brooks, supra note 7, at 114–16; Stark, supra note 20, at 1408–10.
189
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 180, at 4 (arguing in favor of income taxation as a tool for
distribution and regulation).
190
See id. at 26–28 (discussing whether a cash flow consumption tax could be an adequate
substitute for the income tax as a tool for distribution and regulation); infra Section IV.D.1.
187
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problematic for the federal government to instead just ban the states from
piggybacking on the federal government’s tax-base-definition rules and
associated administrative and enforcement infrastructure. Yet we fear that
this might result in state governments just designing their own corporate
and personal income taxes in ways that would still overlap substantially
with the federal government’s, such that tax cannibalization might then be
only minimally alleviated, and that at the expense of increased
administrative and compliance costs. We thus do not view this as an
especially promising reform option and so will not discuss it further.
As a less extreme form of a regulatory stick, the federal government
could perhaps cap the maximum rates at which states would be permitted to
tax corporate or personal income. On its own, this might still be too
draconian an interference with state governments’ fiscal autonomy. But this
approach has greater merit if considered as part of a reform package
whereby the federal government would also offer substantial carrots.
For example, the federal government could require state governments
to cap the maximum rates of their corporate and personal income taxes as a
condition for the states to receive some new carrots. Done right, with
genuinely new carrots, this should mitigate both concerns about
constitutional permissibility and more general worries about interfering
with state governments’ fiscal autonomy.191 Indeed, it might even be both
constitutionally permissible and more generally desirable for the federal
government to go so far as to require states to completely forgo taxing the
corporate income tax base as a conditional requirement for receiving
substantial new carrots.192
Considered on its own, the regulatory sticks category is the least
promising of the four categories of reform options. Yet we do think that
there could be a role for regulatory sticks as part of an overall reform
package that also includes carrots. In particular, caps on states’ corporate
and personal income tax rates could be implemented as conditional
requirements that state governments would need to agree to in exchange for
being offered new carrots.
C.

Price-Based Sticks

Rather than ban the use of overlapping tax bases or cap the maximum
rates allowed on these bases, the federal government could instead attempt
to price in the net negative externalities resulting from state governments’

191

See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 183, at 552–53.
See id. (explaining how it might be constitutionally permissible for Congress to use its tax and
spending powers to limit the state’s use of the corporate income tax).
192
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tax base decisions.193 This approach is theoretically appealing because it
would allow state governments to use whatever tax bases they might desire,
so long as they internalized the national revenue costs of their decisions.194
For instance, if hiking a state-level corporate income tax rate would
cannibalize a net $100 million dollars from other governments, then the
acting state government should theoretically be charged $100 million
dollars upon enacting that tax hike. It would then be up to that state’s
government to decide whether the benefits from going forward with the tax
hike would suffice to justify the $100 million dollar payment required to
compensate other governments for the costs imposed by tax
cannibalization.
Of course, if the acting state’s tax rate surpassed its national revenuemaximizing level, then the theoretically correct tax rate would exceed
100%. This would effectively amount to capping the state’s tax rates. Yet
this outcome is consistent with the philosophy behind price-based sticks.
The goal of pricing in the net negative externality implies that state
governments should be deterred from setting their tax rates in excess of
their national revenue-maximizing levels.
One difficulty in implementing this approach would arise from
determining how to calculate the amount of the penalties to be charged in
light of the considerable uncertainty about many of the key empirical
parameters. However, calibrating policy in the face of uncertainty is a
challenge for most any approach to regulation.195 For instance, determining
the appropriate settings for caps on the states’ maximum tax rates would be
similarly difficult in the light of empirical uncertainty. Moreover, even if
the price charges were set on the low side of the plausible estimates, this
could go a long way toward internalizing the net externalities and thereby
alleviating the tax cannibalization problem.
The more fundamental problem with this approach relates to the same
constitutional and federalism objections we raised to the use of regulatory
sticks. Would charging state governments for the externality costs of tax
193

For an analogous proposal with respect to business taxes in Canada, see Dahlby, Mintz &
Wilson, supra note 40, at 678–79.
194
For general discussions of the relative merits of regulatory command-and-control versus pricebased incentive approaches, see, for example, Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or
Both: A Review of Instrument Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 226 (2006); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
1 (2002).
195
See David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in
Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1326–28 (2004) (explaining that uncertainty is a problem both
when setting corrective tax rates and when setting the levels of caps in command-and-control
regulation).
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cannibalization unduly coerce the states or limit the states’ fiscal autonomy,
either as a matter of constitutional permissibility or of more general
desirability? Again, these concerns are especially troubling to the extent
that we view the federal government as being partially to blame for the tax
cannibalization problem. After all, why should the federal government be
permitted to charge state governments for a problem that is partly of the
federal government’s making?
As before, we consider these objections to be quite serious with
respect to a pure policy of the federal government directly charging state
governments for the costs of tax cannibalization.196 Yet these objections
could be greatly mitigated by instead implementing price-based sticks as a
component of a reform package that would also include substantial carrots.
For instance, if the federal government were to provide substantial new
subsidies to state governments to support the state governments swapping
to greater use of sales taxes, these subsidies could be designed so as to
phase out based on the setting of the state government’s corporate and
personal income tax rates. The amount of this phase-out could then be tied
to estimates of marginal tax cannibalization. In effect, the phase-out of the
subsidies would then become a form of price-based stick.
We thus reach overall similar conclusions for both regulatory sticks
and price-based sticks. Concerns about state fiscal autonomy probably
make a pure sticks-based policy of either sort infeasible. But some use of
sticks is probably needed, and this use can be justified if the sticks are
implemented as a component of a reform package also containing
substantial carrots.
Before proceeding to discuss the sorts of carrots that the federal
government might offer, we note that there is some potential for
implementing what might be considered more limited forms of price-based
sticks without unduly interfering with state governments’ fiscal autonomy.
In particular, the federal government could reform the SALT deduction.
As we previously explained, the SALT deduction currently favors
state-level income taxes over state-level sales taxes.197 Furthermore, the
SALT deduction has always been understood as an optional benefit that the
federal government provides to state governments and to taxpayers.198
196

On the constitutional permissibility question, see supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
Even apart from the constitutionality, it is at least somewhat questionable as a matter of political
economy whether the federal government could, say, charge state governments for setting their tax rates
too high.
197
See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
198
There have been numerous proposals to end or limit the SALT deduction, some successfully
enacted. These proposals have not been viewed as constitutionally problematic. See CONG. BUDGET
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(2008),
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Thus, amending or even terminating this benefit should not be especially
troubling with respect to concerns about state governments’ fiscal
autonomy.
Accordingly, the goal of alleviating tax cannibalization suggests that
the SALT deduction should probably be reformed so as to at least be
neutral with respect to the choice between state-level income and sales
taxes.199 Going further, the SALT deduction ought to perhaps be reformed
so as to actually favor state-level sales taxes. Since 2004, the SALT
deduction has been structured to allow taxpayers a choice of deducting
either their state income tax payments or their state sales tax payments.200
All that would be needed to make the SALT deduction favor sales taxes,
then, would be to end the option to deduct state income tax payments,
while maintaining the deduction for state sales tax payments.
As a supplement to reforming the SALT deduction, the federal
government might also end the deductibility of state corporate income tax
payments against the federal corporate income tax base. State-level
corporate income tax payments are currently deductible as general business
expense deductions. Yet the courts have long held that even business
expense deductions are “allowed as a matter of legislative grace.”201 The
federal government should thus be able to end the deductibility of state
corporate income tax payments, so that these payments would then be
treated like (non-deductible) fines202 rather than like other (deductible) tax
payments. Doing this would effectively be similar to levying a 35% penalty
on state corporate income tax collections.
These approaches of reforming the SALT deduction and ending the
deductibility of state corporate income tax payments show promise as
possible elements for inclusion in a reform package. But we doubt that
these measures could suffice to fully counteract the tax cannibalization
problem on their own. Consequently, more comprehensively addressing the
tax cannibalization problem requires a reform package consisting of both
sticks and carrots.

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/02-20-state_local_tax.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BHZ8-7JYD].
199
This has previously been suggested by Kirk Stark. See Stark, supra note 8, at 437.
200
Id. at 425.
201
White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938); accord New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
202
See I.R.C. § 162(f) (2012) (explaining that fines or penalties paid to a government are not
deductible).
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D.

Regulatory Carrots

So, if carrots are needed, what form should these carrots take? We
previously explained how contemporary federal tax law pushes state
governments toward greater use of the corporate and personal income tax
bases, in part because of the administrative, compliance, and
implementation benefits that states receive from piggybacking on the
federal government’s tax bases.203 Accordingly, providing similar support
for an alternative tax base could assist in incentivizing state governments to
swap toward use of that alternative.
Yet this raises the question of what tax bases would be preferable for
state governments to tax. Earlier we discussed how state-level tax rates on
corporate income, capital gains, and ordinary income are less efficient than
their federal analogs to the extent of horizontal distortions. Through
process of elimination, this potentially suggests that state-level
consumption taxes might be superior in this regard. However, existing
state-level retail sales taxes are deeply flawed, and so do “not in fact share
the many advantages of consumption taxation.”204 Indeed, according to
Stark, these flaws are so severe that the states’ sales taxes are currently
“dying on the vine.”205
Moving state governments toward greater reliance on consumption
taxation is a promising route for fiscal federalism reform. In theory, the
states could rely more heavily on consumption taxes for revenue raising,
combining this with more modest use of the income tax bases to promote
distribution and regulatory goals. However, existing state-level sales taxes
may be too deeply flawed to play such a central role in state-level taxation.
A more fundamental approach for how the federal government might
offer regulatory carrots would thus be to design and implement a new and
improved form of consumption tax base and to then make this new tax base
available for use by the states. A more incremental—and likely more
pragmatic—variation on this approach would be for the federal government
to assist in fixing the flaws that currently plague the states’ retail sales
taxes.

203

See supra Section III.A.
John L. Mikesell, Misconceptions About Value-Added and Retail Sales Taxes: Are They
Barriers to Sensible Policy?, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2014, at 1, 4–6 (quoting GEORGE R.
ZODROW, STATE SALES AND INCOME TAXES 102 (1999)).
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Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Case for Extending the Sales Tax to Services, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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1.

More Fundamental Reforms: Designing and Implementing a New
Tax Base.—Let us begin by briefly suggesting some more
ambitious and fundamental options for reform. One option would be for the
federal government to levy a national VAT and to then dedicate that VAT
to funding state governments.206 Or, as a variation on this option, the federal
government could just implement and administer a VAT infrastructure for
the states to piggyback on with their own state-level tax rates.207 Perhaps
even more promising would be to combine these two options. For instance,
the federal government could levy a national VAT with a low federal tax
rate, the revenues from which would be allocated amongst the states, with
state governments then encouraged to also piggyback on this new VAT tax
base with their own additional state-level tax rates.
As an alternative to a VAT, there are a number of proposals in the
literature for how the federal government might implement some form of
progressive consumption tax.208 Stark has argued that state governments
should consider adopting one of these proposals as a state-level progressive
consumption tax.209 Partly because of tax cannibalization, we doubt that a
state government would be motivated to design and implement a new tax of
this sort on its own initiative. But state governments might well agree to
switch to using this sort of tax base if the federal government did the hard
work of implementation and administration, or even if the federal
government just sufficiently subsidized that hard work.
Ultimately, however, we describe these sorts of proposals as
“ambitious” for good reason. The devil would be in the details for
evaluating such extensive approaches for reform. Among other concerns,
we worry about the administrative and compliance costs associated with
these proposals. There is also a question about whether the federal
government would do an adequate job in designing and administering a tax
base that the federal government would not then use for raising its own
revenues. Nevertheless, we think there is considerable promise in these
sorts of reform proposals. At the very least, we think proposals of this sort
merit further deliberation and consideration as a potential route for
improving fiscal federalism in the United States.
206

Australia does a variation of this. See McLure, supra note 185, at 645 (explaining that Australia
has a federally administered VAT where revenue “is distributed among the states according to a
formula”).
207
The Canadian experience offers lessons in how both state-level VATs and state-level retail sales
taxes can be dramatically improved through cooperation and piggybacking on a federally created VAT
infrastructure. For discussion of this, see Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxes in
Canada: The GST-HST-QST-RST “System,” 63 TAX L. REV. 517 (2010).
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2.

More Incremental Reforms: Supporting the States’ Existing Sales
Tax Bases.—If the more fundamental reform options prove
infeasible, the federal government could instead offer regulatory carrots in
the form of increased support for the states’ existing sales taxes. Because
forty-five states already levy retail sales taxes,210 promoting further and
more effective use of these tax bases is less likely to raise concerns in terms
of potentially increased administrative or compliance costs.
There are currently two central flaws with the states’ sales tax bases.
The federal government could act to address both of these flaws. As we
discussed previously, the first central flaw is the result of the Quill decision
and of Congress’s failure to pass the legislation invited by that decision.211
The federal government could easily act to resolve this flaw.212 At a
minimum, then, this Article’s demonstration of the costs that the federal
government currently suffers from tax cannibalization provides a powerful
new argument for why Congress should quickly legislate a solution to the
Quill problem.213 In the extensive prior literature on the Quill decision, we
know of no one who has previously explained how enabling more effective
state-level sales taxes could serve the federal government’s revenue
interests.214 This further illustrates how instructing policymakers about tax
cannibalization should prod federal level reforms.
The second central flaw in the states’ sales tax bases relates to
pyramiding (sometimes called “cascading”). The federal government could
act to address this flaw also, although doing so would require greater effort.
Pyramiding occurs when a sales tax is applied to business inputs; the more
inputs a business happens to use that it must purchase from other
businesses, the more tax is then built into the first business’s prices.
Pyramiding is both unfair and inefficient. To see why, consider an example
of a small boutique selling clothes. Suppose that the sales tax is applied to
all goods and services, as an ideal consumption tax would be. This means
that the small boutique would need to pay sales tax on its purchase of all
business inputs, from inventory, to printer paper, to its lawyer and plumber.
By comparison, a competing large retail chain, say Gap or J.Crew, would
pay sales tax on fewer of these goods and services, because some would be
produced in-house by employees.
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Scott Drenkard & Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX FOUND. (Apr.
8, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015 [https://perma.cc/AMQ9A77C].
211
See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
212
See supra note 124.
213
See supra Section III.A.
214
See sources cited supra note 124 for some of our prior writings on the Quill decision.
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The tax is unfair because it advantages large, vertically integrated
businesses over smaller competitors. The inefficiency is related to the
unfairness: pursuit of this advantage incentivizes vertical integration so that
more inputs are produced in-house and thereby exempt from sales tax.
Pyramiding is pervasive—the most commonly cited estimate is that
about 40% of sales tax revenue is collected on business inputs.215 Moreover,
pyramiding would be even more ubiquitous, except that the states have
warped the design of their sales tax bases so as to limit the damage from
pyramiding. In particular, state governments currently exempt most
services from their sales tax bases, because pyramiding is an especially
large problem with respect to taxing services.216 But exempting services
then causes further problems by narrowing sales tax bases and distorting
choices between purchases of (taxed) goods and (untaxed) services.
On the international stage, VATs were developed largely as a way to
resolve the pyramiding problem.217 But full VAT-style solutions to the
pyramiding problem are exceedingly difficult for state governments to
implement without a federal-level VAT infrastructure to piggyback on,
because these solutions require some form of border tax adjustments.218
Because goods and services flow relatively freely across state borders, state
governments cannot readily implement the most common approaches for
border tax adjustments used internationally. Indeed, even if feasible, some
commentators have concluded that it might not be constitutionally
permissible for state governments to implement border tax adjustments.219
Yet there is another option for addressing the pyramiding problem. In
theory, all business-to-business purchases could simply be made exempt
from the sales tax base. Alas, a simple rule to this effect would put
enormous pressure on tax authorities to prevent abuse. The primary issue is
that there are numerous dual-use goods—e.g., computers and vehicles—
that consumers could try to purchase free of sales tax by representing
themselves as businesses.220
215

Raymond J. Ring, Jr., Consumers’ Share and Producers’ Share of the General Sales Tax,
52 NAT’L TAX J. 79, 87 (1999).
216
Stark, supra note 205, at 456–58.
217
See Sijbren Cnossen, A VAT Primer for Lawyers, Economists, and Accountants, 124 TAX
NOTES 687, 692 (2009).
218
See Stark, supra note 16, at 441–42.
219
A border tax adjustment would facially impose a surcharge on goods and services coming from
out of state and so would seem to be an example of per se interstate discrimination, and therefore
unconstitutional. But see Darien Shanske, State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: Can Formulary Apportionment Save the World?, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 191 (2014) (summarizing
and questioning the consensus view that border taxes violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
220
McLure, supra note 185, at 650.
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This is where the federal government could helpfully step in.
Effectively administering a sales tax exemption for business-to-business
purchases requires a system for registering businesses and for auditing
transactions that taxpayers claim to be business purchases.221 The federal
government could thus implement and administer a national registration
system for identifying businesses and for auditing business-to-business
purchases. Indeed, the federal government could do this far more
effectively than could state governments, because so many business
purchase transactions cross state borders.222
There are potentially also other ways in which the federal government
might offer regulatory carrots to support state sales tax bases or to facilitate
the states in swapping to alternative forms of taxation. Yet, as our
discussion here suggests, appreciating the most impactful ways in which
the federal government could support state tax bases requires analyzing the
structure of state tax bases at a rather detailed level.
Nevertheless, even if the federal government did nothing more than
legislate a solution to the Quill problem and enact a national registration
system for identifying and auditing business-to-business purchases, these
measures could greatly strengthen the states’ sales tax bases. Through
doing so, these measures could then facilitate state governments transition
toward greater reliance on sales taxation.
More generally, nothing prevents the federal government from acting
to help strengthen the state’s sales tax bases or assisting with other
alternative state-level tax bases. What has heretofore been lacking was
motivation for the federal government to do so. Understanding the costs
that tax cannibalization currently imposes on the federal government
should thus provide that motivation.
E.

Price-Based Carrots

Regulatory carrots work well when the federal government has
specific plans for which alternative tax bases to support and how to support
those alternative tax bases through cost-effective interventions. Otherwise,
price-based carrots may be the better approach.
221

See id. at 673.
A new federal system for registering businesses and auditing business-to-business transactions
could be created either as a new bureaucracy or enforced by the IRS. Under current law, the IRS can
share information upon a written request from a state, I.R.C § 6103(d)(1), and there is a great deal of
federal–state sharing. One additional specific expedient could be for the states to assign a transactional
code to exempt business purchases and for the federal government to require that that code be entered
on a registered business’s federal income tax return in connection with claiming business expense
deductions. This would thus help with the creation of an auditable paper trail. See McLure, supra note
185, at 699–700.
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The most straightforward forms of price-based carrots are monetary
subsidies provided either to state governments directly or to taxpayers
within the state. These subsidies could be offered to support the use of
specific alternative tax bases, such as sales taxes. Or, these subsidies could
be offered in a less targeted fashion, but with the subsidies then designed to
phase out to the extent that the state government taxes the corporate or
personal income tax bases—such that the phase-outs would become a form
of price-based stick. Alternatively, the subsidies could be offered
conditional on state governments agreeing to cap their top corporate and
personal income tax rates—such that this condition would become a form
of regulatory stick. Price-based carrots can thus be flexible tools, especially
when combined with the other approaches.
Price-based carrots can be self-financing. This is easiest to see when
state governments’ tax rates exceed their national revenue-maximizing
levels. The federal government should then be able to induce state
governments to reduce these tax rates by offering price-based carrots that
are smaller than the federal government’s expected revenue gain.223
Similarly, consider price-based carrots offered to induce state
governments to swap from marginal use of, say, corporate income tax rates
to sales tax rates. As we explained earlier, state governments should be
indifferent at the margin between raising a dollar from either of these tax
rates.224 Relatively small price-based carrots should thus suffice to induce
state governments to swap to greater use of sales tax rates. Consequently,
the federal government’s revenue gain from offering these carrots may be
many times larger than the cost of the carrots.
F.

Summary, Synthesis, and Addressing Size-of-Government Concerns

Even if the federal government needed to spend a dollar to cancel out
each dollar of tax cannibalization, this could still significantly enhance
national welfare. The reason is that the biases associated with tax
cannibalization that we focus on in Parts II and III represent pure economic
waste. For instance, imagine if the federal government were to pay state
governments a dollar to induce the state governments to reduce tax
cannibalization by a dollar by swapping to greater reliance on sales taxes.
The federal government would effectively break even from this transaction.
But the state governments would be a dollar richer. Thus, in effect, the
federal government would have funded that dollar payment by eradicating
a dollar of economic waste.
223
224

See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.C.
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By designing a mixed package of both sticks and carrots, the federal
government should be able to alleviate tax cannibalization while spending
much less than a dollar for each dollar of tax cannibalization eliminated.
The federal government could thereby engineer a “win, win, win”—for the
federal government, for state governments, and for taxpayers.
We can now relax our working assumption that state governments
operate subject to strict revenue and distribution constraints. In place of
that assumption, we can instead see how the federal government could
control for state government revenues and distribution when implementing
reforms to alleviate tax cannibalization.
To control for revenues, all the federal government should need to do
is to adjust the relative mix of carrots and sticks. Offering larger carrots
could increase state governments’ revenues; using larger sticks could
decrease state governments’ revenues.
The federal government could similarly adjust the overall package of
reforms to control for distribution. For example, if federal policymakers
worry that reforms would lower the progressivity of state taxes, the federal
government could compensate by providing some amount of subsidies
directly to low- and middle-income taxpayers in the form of tax credits.
Alternatively, the federal government could incentivize state governments
to provide these sorts of subsidies.225
Whether and to what extent the federal government should aim to
influence state governments’ decisions about revenues or distribution is a
different question, and a question that we are agnostic on for the purposes
of this Article.226 Our goal with this discussion is only to explain how the
federal government could control for state government revenues and
distribution when enacting reforms to combat tax cannibalization. Our
point is that concerns about the potential implications for state
governments’ revenues or for distribution should not stand in the way of
otherwise desirable reforms for alleviating tax cannibalization.
The source of the current tax cannibalization problem is ultimately a
coordination failure between the federal and state governments. We focus
on national welfare and evaluate this coordination failure from the federal
government’s perspective, primarily because the federal government is in a
much better position to alleviate the tax cannibalization problem. But this
225

This could be done through carrots (or sticks) directed toward state governments. This could
also be done by adjusting the mechanics of the SALT deduction, as Stark has previously discussed. See
Stark, supra note 20, at 1424–32.
226
Stark has argued that the federal government should be neutral as to state governments’
distribution policies. He thus criticizes the current structure of the SALT deduction for how it departs
from this principle of being neutral as to distribution. Id. at 1425–32.
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does not mean that we view state governments as the culpable party. Quite
the contrary, we have emphasized how the federal government is in a sense
to blame. Indeed, it is partly for this reason that the federal government is
better positioned to alleviate the problem.
CONCLUSION
Tax cannibalization is a black hole in the galaxy of fiscal federalism in
the United States. Despite its immense and destructive gravitational force,
neither state nor federal policymakers directly perceive its existence. Nor,
until now, have legal scholars.
We suspect that a major reason for the invisibility of the tax
cannibalization problem is because state-level policymakers only generally
request revenue estimates for how state governments’ tax policy choices
affect state revenues. Then, likewise, federal-level policymakers only
generally request revenue estimates for how federal government tax policy
choices affect federal revenues. As a consequence, the effects of state
governments’ tax policy choices on federal revenues are not apparent in
these revenue estimates.227
Indeed, we first discovered the tax cannibalization problem in part
through observing its (unhelpful) gravitational force from afar. Both of us
regularly advise state-level lawmakers and their staff on tax policy issues,
especially in California, but also sometimes in other states. Through the
course of this policy advisory work, we evaluated some proposals for statelevel tax reform that we thought would enhance national welfare, and yet
we found that these reform proposals would generate surprisingly little
revenue for the state considering the reforms. After some reflection, we
realized that the reason for this was that the missing revenue would end up
with the federal government.
Although we cannot further elaborate the specifics here, imagine
(hypothetically) a proposal for a state to reduce its corporate income tax
rate and to then make up for the lost revenue by levying something similar
to New Hampshire’s Business Enterprise Tax. As we discussed
previously,228 a proposal of this sort could lessen tax cannibalization to the
extent that the proposal would successfully reduce the ways in which the
state’s taxes previously piled on to the flaws in the federally defined
corporate income tax base that invite vertical distortions. But, again, the
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For discussion of the critical role that revenue and distribution estimates play in influencing tax
policy, see, for example, Boris I. Bittker, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 213
(1994); Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995).
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See supra Section III.B.6.
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revenue benefits from this would largely end up with the federal
government rather than with the acting state.
It should thus come as no surprise that the state-level policymakers we
were advising lost interest in these proposed reforms upon realizing that the
reforms would generate little in the way of benefit for the state
government. Why after all should a state government incur the costs of
implementing and administering tax reforms without receiving most of the
benefit?
In addition to the question of revenue estimates, the invisibility of tax
cannibalization also contributes to the apathy that federal lawmakers have
shown toward fiscal federalism issues for at least the past couple decades.
For instance, there is currently little in the way of resources dedicated to
analyzing the fiscal issues that arise in the American federation. For a short
time in the 1960s, Congress itself convened a subcommittee to study state
and local tax issues. The result of this, the report of the Willis
Subcommittee,229 is an enduring classic in the field, in part because it
prepared data never collected before230 or since.
Then, besides the Willis Subcommittee, there used to be an
organization dedicated to studying the operation of our federal system,
including its underlying fiscal dynamics: the American Council on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Formed in 1959, the ACIR issued
dozens of important reports and policy proposals, many of which
substantially influenced law reform. Yet the ACIR was dissolved in 1996.
Nevertheless, the ACIR’s reports on features of American federalism are
still cited as invaluable resources—resources that have not been updated
for twenty years.231
Beyond any specific substantive reforms, we thus think it imperative
that more attention be paid to fiscal federalism issues. If we have
accomplished nothing else with this Article, we hope to at least have
229

SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMM., STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H. R. REP. No. 88-1480 (1964).
230
See Jerome R Hellerstein, Federal Legislation on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Key
Areas of Controversy, WM. & MARY ANN. TAX CONF., 1966, at 21, 22–23 (explaining that the Willis
Report was “the most extensive study of state taxation of interstate commerce in our history”).
231
See Bruce D. McDowell, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996: The
End of an Era, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 111, 113–14 (1997). As for the continued relevance of the
ACIR’s work, see, for example, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Governing Communities by
Auction, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 n.16, 8 n.52 (2014) (citing ACIR reports for characteristics of
residential associations); Elliott Dubin, Changes in State Corporate Tax Apportionment Formulas and
Tax Bases, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 563, 563 & n.3 (2010) (updating analysis pioneered by ACIR); Daniel L.
Smith & Yilin Hou, Balanced Budget Requirements and State Spending: A Long–Panel Study, PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2013, at 1, 2 (citing ACIR study as part of literature review on balanced
budgets).
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established that the federal government has a large and direct stake in statelevel tax policy decisions. Neither national welfare nor federal
policymakers’ more parochial interests are thus likely to be served through
continued neglect. There is much that we do not know about the fiscal
functioning of our federal system, but much that we do not know is
potentially knowable.
Our primary goal with this Article was to bring the heretoforeinvisible phenomenon of tax cannibalization into revealing light. We have
no doubt that future scholarship will uncover additional dimensions to the
tax cannibalization problem and thereby bring the phenomenon into even
greater light. Through such scholarship, we can help policymakers to
understand and take account of the large costs that the federal government
currently suffers from tax cannibalization. Then, having seen that there are
high stakes involved for all parties, we can collectively work toward a new
era of more productive state and federal government fiscal relations.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Our Basic Model for Approximating Tax Cannibalization
As we explained in Section II.B, our model uses five empirical
parameters as inputs: (1) the effective marginal federal tax rate (TRF), (2)
the effective marginal tax rate of the other states to which taxable activity
relocates through horizontal distortions (TRO), (3) the effective marginal
tax rate of the acting state (TRA), (4) the semi-elasticity of the vertical
distortions induced by adjusting the acting state’s tax rate (VD), and (5) the
semi-elasticity of the horizontal distortions induced by adjusting the acting
state’s tax rate (HD).
Our model then produces as outputs: (A) the acting state’s revenuemaximizing level for its tax rate (TRARM), (B) the national revenuemaximizing level for the acting state’s tax rate (TRNRM), and (C) the
marginal tax cannibalization at any specified level for the acting state’s tax
rate (MTC).
Thus, in this technical appendix, we explain how we derive the
following three expressions (which are the source for all of the
approximations in the article):
(A) TRARM =
(B) TRNRM =

(C) 𝑀𝑇𝐶 =
A.

!""
(!"!!")
!""! !"×!"! ! !"× !"!
!"!!"
!"× !"! !(!"×!"! )
!""! !"! × !"!!"

Deriving the Expression for the Acting State’s Revenue-Maximizing
Level for Its Tax Rate (TRARM)

To begin with, we define 𝑇𝐵! as the acting state’s tax base in dollars,
and ASR as the Acting State’s Revenue—that is, the revenue the acting
state generates by applying its tax rate (𝑻𝑹𝑨 ) to that tax base (𝑻𝑩𝑨 ). We
list our tax rate inputs as percentages (out of 100) instead of as decimals,
and so must divide them by one hundred to yield decimals.
Thus:
Acting State’s Revenue (ASR) =
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And so:
𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝐵!
𝑑𝐴𝑆𝑅 𝑇𝐵!
=
+
×
100
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝑅! 100
Then, because the shrinkage to 𝑇𝐵! in dollars that is induced by
increasing TRA is given by multiplying (VD + HD)/100 by 𝑇𝐵! , we have:
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅!
− 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷
𝑑𝐴𝑆𝑅
=
+
× 𝑇𝐵! ×
100
100
100
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
Then, setting to zero and simplifying:
0=

𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅! × 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷
× 1−
100
100

Finally, solving for the value of 𝑇𝑅! gives us the value that maximizes
the acting state’s revenue, or:
(A) 𝑇𝑅! =
B.

!""
(!"!!")

Deriving the Expression for the National Revenue-Maximizing Level
for the Acting State’s Tax Rate (TRNRM)

To begin with, we define FR as the Federal Government’s Revenue in
dollars—that is, the revenue the federal government generates by applying
its tax rate (TRF) to the national tax base. We similarly define OSR as the
Other States’ Revenue in dollars—that is, the revenue the other states
collectively generate from applying their effective tax rate (TRO) to the
portion of the national tax base that locates within the other states (as
opposed to within the acting state). We then define NR as the National
Revenue in dollars, which is the sum of ASR, OSR, and FR. In other words:
NR = ASR + OSR + FR. For simplicity, we assume that there are no
interactions between vertical and horizontal distortions, such that the
Federal Government’s Revenue is only affected by vertical distortions and
Other States’ Revenue is only affected by horizontal distortions.
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Thus:
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅! × 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷
𝑑𝐴𝑆𝑅
=
× 1−
100
100
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑂𝑆𝑅
=
× 𝐻𝐷 ×
100
100
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝐹𝑅
=
× −𝑉𝐷 ×
100
100
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
Summing these three derivatives gives us:
𝑑𝑁𝑅
𝑑𝐴𝑆𝑅 𝑑𝑂𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝐹𝑅
=
+
+
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
Then inputting from above and setting to zero and then simplifying:
0 =

𝑇𝐵!
×
100

1−

𝑇𝑅! × 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷
100

0 = 100 − 𝑇𝑅! × 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷

+ 𝐻𝐷×

𝑇𝑅!
𝑇𝑅!
− 𝑉𝐷×
100
100

+ 𝐻𝐷× 𝑇𝑅! − 𝑉𝐷× 𝑇𝑅!

Finally, solving for the value of 𝑇𝑅! gives us the value that maximizes
national revenue, or:
(B) TRNRM =
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Deriving the Expression for Marginal Tax Cannibalization (MTC)
To begin with, by definition:
−
𝑀𝑇𝐶 =

𝑑𝑂𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝐹𝑅
+
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝑇𝑅!
𝑑𝐴𝑆𝑅
𝑑𝑇𝑅!

Then, inputting from earlier:
𝑀𝑇𝐶 =

−

𝑇𝑅!
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅!
𝑇𝐵!
× 𝐻𝐷×
+
× −𝑉𝐷 ×
100
100
100
100
𝑇𝐵!
𝑇𝑅! × 𝑉𝐷 + 𝐻𝐷
× 1 −
100
100

Finally, simplifying gives us:
(C) 𝑀𝑇𝐶 =

!"× !"! !(!"×!"! )
!""! !"! × !"!!"
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